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Fisheries Management Paper No. 67 
Executive Summary 
This report has been written following approval by the Minister for Fisheries of a 
recommendation by the Rock Lobster Industry Advisory Committee that a major evaluation 
of future management options for the western rock lobster fishery be undertaken. 
The Terms of Reference focused the report on the options for future management of the 
fishery in relation to (i) the continued use of input controls and (ii) the use of output controls. 
The Reference included a requirement to consider the optimum fleet size and its associated 
implications for the rules for pot transfer, pot reduction and licence splitting. The reference to 
pot reduction has a flow-on effect to boat replacements. 
In the writing of this report, extensive use has been made of three associated reports prepared 
by specialists in economics, marketing and law enforcement. They are recommended reading 
in their own right and also in relation to a better understanding of the contents and 
consideration of this report. The three reports are identified in Section 1. 
The report provides background information on the management strategies and principal 
elements of the fishery, its stock status, the use of input and output controls and the size of 
the fishing fleet. The report concludes with an examination of the effect of maintaining effort 
(input) controls and moving to a system of variable effort (TAE/ITEs) or moving to direct 
(output) controls on the catch (TAC/ITQs) which could vary annually, and a discussion. 
The report draws attention to the principal finding of the three specialist reports and 
examines those findings in relation to the options for the long term management of the 
fishery. The cost and effectiveness of law enforcement would be a major factor to be 
considered if a TAC/ITQ system of management was adopted. However, the introduction of 
this system of management would probably increase the net returns to the industry i f  the 
number of boats in the rock lobster fishery was allowed to be reduced to a level decided 
purely by market forces and if there was not a required nexus between the number of pots 
per boat and the catch quotas after the initial allocation process. 
Although the major thrust of the report is to provide information on the alternative uses of 
input effort and output catch controls, there is an associated question of fleet size. A decision 
on this subject has a flow-on effect on the lower and upper limits of either the number of pots 
allowed to be used or individual catches allowed to be taken. The social and regional 
advantages of introducing a figure for the lower limit of the number of boats in the fleet need 
to be judged against the financial cost to the industry resulting from imposing a constraint on 
the free flow of market forces and the decision-making ability of each operator. 
There is a sound record of past management of the western rock ldbster fishery, but it has 
resulted in an increasing array of input constraints. During the past decade the discussion 
and literature on fisheries management, both within Australia and overseas, has focussed on 
the ways and means of giving attention to the problems arising from rapid improvements in 
fishing technology as well as the desire of both government and industry to increase the 
economic efficiency of fishing practices. Management of the western rock lobster fishery has 
to take account of the changing circumstances to ensure that the measures adopted provide 
the benefits being sought and that its management remains one of the outstanding examples 
of management achievement. This will require objective analysis of the alternatives available 
and a high degree of cooperation between all of the interested parties. 
The decisions taken resulting from a consideration of this report, and the associated specialist 
reports, on the western rock lobster fishery will be vital to its long term management. It is 
essential that all those engaged in the fishery consider the past growth in the fishing pressure, 
their vision for the industry in, say, ten years from now, and the most appropriate method of 
management in achieving that vision. There are likely to be three principal elements:- 
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(a) The potential to increase the value of the catch and the net retum to the industry as a 
whole. 
The best long term management method, input or output controls, taking into account 
the overriding requirement to ensure an adequate breeding stock but also considering 
that there is now an increasing focus on economic efficiency in fisheries management. 
The fleet size and its associated implications for the net retums as well as for the 




The Rock Lobster Industry Advisory Committee (RLIAC) recommended in its report to the 
Minister for Fisheries on 23 October 1992 "that the Minister endorse the formation of a RLIAC 
Sub-committee to undertake a major evaluation of future management options for the rock 
lobster fishery". 
The Minister's approval of the recommendation was notified by the Executive Director of the 
Fisheries Department to all rock lobster licence holders on 12 November 1992. A copy of the 
Executive Director's letter and the Report of the Advisory Committee to the Minister are part 
of the documentation included in Fisheries Management Paper No. 53. 
The need for the evaluation of future management options has arisen as a result of a concern 
by RLIAC that the exploitation rate generated by continually increasing fishing effort had 
reduced the breeding stock to the extent that there was now a possibility of a consequential 
reduction in the average level of recruitment. Although the number of boats and the number 
of pots in the fishery had been reduced during the five years to 1991/92, the reductions to 
that time appeared to have only slowed the rate of increase in the exploitation rate because of 
the continuing increase in efficiency of each boat operating in the fishery. 
The RLIAC Sub-committee was given the task of developing a paper which evaluated the 
use of direct catch controls and variable effort controls as m e ~ o d s  of ensuring the long term 
maintenance of the western rock lobster fishery. 
The Sub-Committee was established in January 1993 with the following terms of reference. 




a total allowable catch (TAC) and/or individual transferable quotas (ITQ); 
variable effort controls in the fishery and size controls on rock lobster, ie. the existing 
system of individual transferable pots or effort units (ITE). 
? 
2. To assess the ramifications of fleet size changes including impacts on: 
(a) administrative, economic and social factors; 
(b) rules for pot transfer, pot reduction and licence splitting. 
Membership of the Sub-committee is set out in Attachment 1. This report has been prepared 
by Mr Bernard Bowen for the Sub-committee, in his capacity as a consultant, but he was 
assisted greatly by inputs of information and suggestions from his colleagues. ..' 
Since the appointment of the Sub-committee, RLIAC has proposed, and the Minister has 
approved, a significant change in the management arrangements for the 1993/94 and 
1994/95 seasons: in essence a two year trial of a variable ITE system. The RLIAC Report to 
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the Minister outlining these arrangements has been published as Fisheries Management 
Paper No. 55. The principal elements of the arrangements for these two seasons are:- 
(a) A temporary 18 per cent pot reduction for commercial fishermen in all zones. 
(b) A change in the legal minimum carapace length from 76 mm to 77 mm for the periods 
commencing at the start of each season (15 November) to the following 31 January. 
(c) A legal maximum carapace length of 115 mm for female rock lobsters, but with a 
further constraint that rock lobsters with a carapace length greater than 105 mm are not 
permitted to be landed north of Wedge Island. 
(d) All setose and tarspot female rock lobsters to be returned to the water. 
The management arrangements established for the 1993/94 and 1994/95 rock lobster seasons 
are expected to reduce sigruficantly the exploitation rate so that, over time, the breeding stock 
is increased and stabilised at a level at which there is a reasonable expectation that there will 
be long term sustainable recruitment. However, RLIAC agreed that the introduction of these 
arrangements did not reduce the need for industry to have a review document which 
considered the use of variable effort controls, as an extension of the current pot controls, and 
the use of catch quotas as an alternative management arrangement. 
The need for the document is twofold:- 
(a) The current input management arrangements may be shown to be not effective 
(because of increasing industry efficiency or industry resistance to the concept of 
variable effort controls) in reducing the exploitation rate to the extent required, or 
which may be required in the future, and under these conditions other arrangements 
would become necessary. 
(b) Even if the management arrangements are shown to be effective in reducing the 
exploitation rate, it is appropriate that the rock lobster industry and the community 
generally have an opportunity to consider other arrangements which may provide 
greater certainty in management directions as well as economic and financial benefits 
to the WA economy over time. 
Some of the information provided in the early Sections of.& report will be well known to 
those in the rock lobster industry. However, as the report is likely to be read by a larger 
audience, a description of the major elements of the fishery has been included. 
In preparing this report for the rock lobster industry, the writer has had the benefit of three 
specialist reports prepared for the Sub-committee on (i) marketing, (ii) economics and (iii) 
law enforcement. These specialist reports have been produced as separate documents, but 
they are essential reading for those who desire further information on some of the matters 
discussed in this management report. The specialist reports are:- 
(a) Lindner, R. K. (1994). Economic efficiency of alternative input and output based 
management systems in the western rock lobster fishery. 
(b) MAREC PTY LTD (1994). A market based economic assessment of a preferred 
management structure for the catching sector of the Western Australian rock lobster 
fishery. 
(c) McLaughlan, N. E. (1994). west coast rock lobster fishery law enforcement 
considerations. 
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Reference is made in this report to a number of documents in addition to the specialist 
papers. These and a limited number of general papers about the western rock lobster fishery 
are listed in Section 10 so that readers can obtain further information if they so desire. 
2 Management strategies 
The Fisheries Department's Strategic Plan 1992/93 sets out its Mission and Key Objectives. 
The Department's mission is:- . 
"To manage the harvesting of fisheries resources at ecologically sustainable levels, and to 
manage the development of aquaculture, in order to maxirnise economic benefits to the state, 
while conserving and protecting the state's aquatic ecosystem for the bent@ of the present and 
future West Australian community. " 
The first two Key Objectives in the Strategic Plan are particularly relevant to the westem rock 
lobster fishery. These are:- 
"1. Ecologically sustainable resource use. 
To have harvesting andfishing offisheries resources at ecologically sustainable levels. 
2. Social and economic benefits to the community. 
To maximise the economic, social and other benefits derived from fhe state's aquatic biological 
resources. " 
The western rock lobster fishery is the most valuable fishery in Australia. It provides 
employment and financial reward for both the catching and the processing sectors from 
Shark Bay to Cape Leeuwin. It is important that the approaches to management for both the 
catching and processing sectors be identified so that there is a basis for understanding the 
strategies adopted to date and for considering the options for management in the future. 
In the commercial catching sector, perhaps the two most important management initiatives 
have been the decision to limit entry to the fishery (in 1963) wd the decision to implement 
and enforce controls on effort so as to maintain the rock lobster stocks. Economic and social 
consequences have also been given attention when determining the management strategies 
although they may not have been specifically identified in those terms. 
The commercial take of rock lobsters accounts for between 94 and 97 per cent of the rock 
lobster catch. The remaining catch is taken by the recreational fishers under the rules 
established for this activity. Each licensed recreational rock lobster fisher is allowed to 
operate two rock lobster pots and take a maximum of 8 rock lobsters per day. However, there 
is no constraint on the number of licences issued each year. 
The processing sector has been recognised as an integral part of the rock lobster fishery. Until 
1966 any person who wanted to establish a rock lobster processing establishment was free to 
do so. However, following considerable debate during the 1960s about the number and 
locality of rock lobster processing factories, the Fisheries Act was amended in 1966 to require 
each processing establishment to hold a licence. Also, the Director of Fisheries was given the 
authority to grant or not to grant such a licence on the grounds of it being in the "better 
.interests of the fishing industry". 
. 
The commercial catching sector 
(a) 
The rock lobster fleet expanded rapidly in the late 1950s. New boats were being built and 
were entering the fishery at a rate of between fifty and one hundred per year. The catch was 
increasing but at a rate considerably less than the rate of increase in fishing boats and rock 
lobster pots. The number of pots in the water increased by 66 per cent from 1958/59 to 
1961/62 while the production during that time increased by only 8 per cent. Consequently, 
Limitation of entry to the fishery 
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the catch per pot was declining. This rapid build up of the rock lobster fleet became a topic of 
considerable debate within the fishing industry and at meetings of the then Fishermen's 
Advisory Committee. 
The debate resulted in the development of a philosophy that entry to the rock lobster fishery 
should be restricted. At that time information was not available on either the exploitation rate 
being generated by the fishing fleet or the effect of the increasing fishing pressure on the long 
term maintenance of the resource. However, the rate of increase in the number of boats and 
pots was sufficient to cause the Advisory Committee to recommend that the better interests of 
the fishing industry would be served by limiting entry to the rock lobster fishery. 
The date of commencement of the limited entry policy was 1 March 1963. Associated with the 
limitation on entry was a specification that each boat was allowed to use only three pots per 
foot of boat length. This was a major development in the use of input controls as a method of 
management. The measure resulted in there being a discrete number of boats. However, in 
1963 there was no control on the length of replacement boats, thus the number of pots 
increased although not at the same rate as that recorded in the late 1950s and early 1960s. 
Controls on the length of boat replacements were introduced in 1965 which resulted in the 
stabilisation of the registered number of pots in the fishery. During the late 1960s and early 
1970s specific law enforcement action was taken to ensure that illegal overpotting was 
brought under control, and the take of undersize rock lobsters was also brought under 
control. 
In the early years of limited entry to the rock lobster fishery, the benefits flowing to the 
industry could be classed as both social and economic. The fleet, being fixed in terms of the 
number of boats, could be distributed along the coast in an orderly manner, and the owners 
were secure in the knowledge that there would be no further entrants. Also, there would be 
economic stability so long as the markets remained available and the exploitation rate 
generated by the fleet did not lead to over fishing. 
As knowledge about the exploitation rate being generated by the fishing fleet increased 
during the 1970s and 1980s, it became clear to both the fishery.managers and those engaged 
in the industry that the fishing pressure should be controlled. The limitation on the number of 
boats and pots had not, of themselves, been fully effective in containing growth in the 
exploitation rate. Action was taken to reduce the length of the season and to define the size 
and structure of the rock lobster pot. In later years, action was also taken to reduce the 
number of pots being used. 
A review of the information available in 1992 showed that technological improvements had 
further increased the exploitation rate to a very high level, and the, abundance of breeding 
female rock lobsters had been reduced such that there was very serious concern that the 
recruitment may not be able to be maintained. This is discussed in more detail in (b) below. 
To stabilise and then reduce the exploitation rate, attention had to focus on the number of 
pots allowed to be used, the times during the year that they could be worked, and the types 
and sizes of rock lobsters which may be legally retained. 
Ideally, a reduction in the number of rock lobster pots by, say, ten percent for a season would 
result in a similar reduction in catch, and thus in the exploitation rate. However, this can not 
be expected to occur. During the 'white' rock lobster season, there is a reasonably direct 
correlation between the number of pots used and the exploitation rate at that time, but this 
has been less evident for the 'red' season because of the excess capacity of the fleet in terms of 
days available for fishing. Furthermore, rock lobsters which are not caught at the beginning 
of the fishing season because of the reduced number of pots may still be caught later in the 
season. However, it is the rock lobster pot which is the essential unit of fishing capacity, and 
control of its effective use is the principal tool available to the fisheries manager using input 
controls. 
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In summary, the management strategy adopted in 1963, restricting the number of boats and 
rock lobster pots, has resulted in social and economic benefits for those engaged in the 
fishery. However, since that time, and despite the introduction of a series of management 
measures, the exploitation rate has continued to increase to the extent that in 1993 it was clear 
that there was again a need to impose further constraints on the fishing effort to keep the 
catch at a sustainable level. This was given attention by the introduction of new management 
arrangements for the 1993/94 and 1994/95 seasons. The alternative to the use of further input 
controls as a method of controlling the exploitation rate is to impose by management a direct 
control on the catch, ie. output controls. This alternative management philosophy, and its 
advantages and disadvantages, is discussed later in this report. Irrespective of which method 
of management is adopted, the catch must not be allowed to increase beyond that which can 
be sustained. 
(b) Stock Maintenance 
Maintenance of the rock lobster stocks depends upon its reproductive capacity which 
requires that the breeding stock be maintained at or above a level which provides sufficient 
egg production for stable recruitment under the normal range of variations in environmental 
conditions. Recruitment into the rock lobster stocks, as measured by the relative abundance of 
puerulus settlement, varies from year to year. However, this has been shown to date to be 
associated with variations in the oceanic environment, for example the flow of the Leeuwin 
Current, rather than the level of egg production or the number of mature female rock lobsters 
along the coast. 
There is a growing number of fisheries throughout the world for which it appears that the 
fishing pressure has been increased to such a high level that the number of breeding female 
animals remaining has not been sufficient to sustain recruitment, ie. there has been 
recruitment overfishing. While some reduction in breeding stock levels is inevitable, and can 
even be beneficial, if there is excessive removal of breeders there can be either a dramatic 
reduction or a gradual, but continuing, reduction in the recruitment of juvenile lobsters and 
thus the catch. Whwhever the case, the implications for both industry and management are 
traumatic. 
The specific level of breeding stock at which this "recruitment overfishing" takes place can not 
be known until it is reached for the first time. Clearly, considerable catches can be taken 
without causing recruitment overfishing. However, increasing efficiency of the fishing fleet 
results in fewer female rock lobsters surviving to breed, and as a consequence egg production 
is reduced. 
The question to be addressed is the level to which a breeding stock can be reduced, as a 
percentage of the breeding stock before fishing commenced, and there still be sufficient egg 
production to sustain average recruitment. This subject is discussed in Section 4. However, 
the essential element is that the Fisheries Department has a responsibility to ensure that 
"fisheries resources (are maintained) at ecologically sustainable levels" as set out in Key 
Objective 1 of the Department's 1992-93 Strategic Plan. To achieve this objective, the breeding 
stock must be held at or above a level considered to be safe based on experience from other 
fisheries and assessed by the specialists in this field of research. 
, 
A decision on the fisheries management approach by which this objective can be best 
achieved will require a detailed examination of the options available and extensive discussion 
within the fishing industry and between industry and government. 
The processing sector 
The rock lobster processing sector has been judged to be of such importance to the state's rock 
lobster fishery that additional licences to undertake the full array of rock lobster processing 
have not been granted by the Director since the introduction of the processing licence 
provisions into the Fisheries Act in 1966. The decision to constrain the number of processing 
establishments also took into account the need for efficiency of enforcement of the critical 
regulations about the size limits and berried females. One additional licence was granted in 
/' 
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the 1970s as a result of an appeal to a Magistrate, the appellate body at that time. There are 
now nineteen processing establishments licensed to undertake the full array of processing 
wcistern rock lobsters. However, following a rationalisation of processing centres, one of the 
licences is 'dormant', ie. it is not being used. This being the case, there are eighteen active rock 
lobster processing establishments, with receival depots along the coast. 
In September 1989, the Minister for Fisheries issued a policy statement about the future 
licensing of rock lobster processing establishments, published in Fisheries Management Paper 
No. 30. This statement set out that there was merit in adopting a policy of not licensing 
additional rock lobster processing establishments, and endorsed the decisions taken 
administratively that the management philosophy in relation to the processing sector should 
be to stabilise the number of processing establishments. It had been judged that the existing 
number of establishments provided the fishing sector with sufficient opportunities for sale of 
their product to ensure that a purchasing monopoly situation did not arise. 
The catching and processing sectors are mutually dependent one upon the other. The 
processing sector relies upon the catching sector to supply rock lobsters in first class 
condition. The catching sector depends upon the processing sector to provide high quality 
processing of lobsters and sales to the world market as well as providing support services, ie. 
bait and other essential fishing requirements. The catching and processing sectors' 
dependence upon each other led, in the early days of the fishery, to the formation of 
fishermen's cooperatives. The two cooperatives now operating successfully have a 
throughput of about 50 per cent of the total catch. Their method of operation has ensured that 
the fishermen receive the major portion of the benefits flowing from an increase in the value 
of the rock lobster products sold, and those benefits are passed in turn to the wider 
community. The processing sector generally do not hold lobster pot licences. Processing 
company ownership of vessels was tried in the 1960s and 1970s but was not very successful 
commercially. 
Summary of the principal management measures and major initiatives 
A summary of the principal management measures introduced and some of the major 



















Principal management measure or initiative 
Limited entry introduced for the rock lobster fishery. A total of 836 
vessels authorised to operate in the fishery. The number of pots 
allowed was set at 3 pots per foot of boat length. 
The boat replacement policy required that a boat be replaced with one 
of the same length so that the number of pots did not increase. The 
number of pots in the fishery was 76,623. 
A requirement that each pot have an escape gap measuring 51 mm X 
305 mm. 
A licence was required before a processing factory could be 
established. 
Puerulus collectors were established at Doneara and in 1969 at Turien. 
On board monitoring began so as to obtain information on the length 
frequency of the catch by area and depth. 
The first of the 45 freezer/catcher rock lobster boats left the fisherv. 
The height of the escape gap was increased to 54 mm. 
Multiple entrances in pots were prohibited. 
The fishing season was shortened by 6 weeks from 15 November-15 
August to 15 November-30 June. 
The boat replacement policy was amended to introduce the "7 and 10" 
rule in relation to the number of Dots Der metre of boat length. 
The size of pots regulated 
A temporary reduction of 10 per cent in the number of pots allowed to 
be used. 
The number of escape gaps required in a rock lobster pot increased to 
3 or 4 depending on the type of pot. 
A permanent 10 per cent pot reduction commenced at 2 per cent per 
year. Reduction process completed by the end of the 1991/92 season. 
A summer closure in zone B for the period 10 January to 9 February. 
Closure not continued in the subsequent seasons. Legal maximum 
length of 115 mm. Setose and tarspot rock lobster to be retumed to the 
water for the period 15 November to 28 February. 10 per cent pot 
reduction in zone B for the period 15 November to 10 January. In zone 
C, until'April 1993, boats had to nominate a landing zone, each zone 
north of Fremantle being 10 nautical miles. 
An 18 per cent pot reduction for the 1993/94 and 1994/95 seasons. 
Setose and tarspot rock lobsters to be returned to the water at all times. 
The legal minimum length increased toi77 mm for the period 15 
November to 31 January. Legal maximum length of 105 mm north of 
Wedee Island and 115 mrn south of Wedee Island. 
Note: Zone A is the waters around the Abrolhos Islands, zone B is the waters north of 30 O S 
latitude and zone C is the waters south of 30" S latitude. The precise boundaries for each zone 
are set out in the legislation. 
3 The principal elements of the fishery 
The principal elements of the western rock lobster fishery, in relation to its long term 
maintenance, are (i) the catch, (ii) the exploitation rate, (iii) the level of breeding stock and 
puerulus settlement and (iv) the recruitment into the fishery. 
The 1992/93 catch 
The catch for the 1992/93 season, 12,303 tomes, was one of the highest on record, with a 
landed value of $230 million. The table below shows that the catches for the past decade have 
averaged 10,600 tomes. 
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I Season I Zone A I Zone B I Zone C I To tal I 
The high catch in 1992/93 was the result of a very successful 'white' rock lobster season 
followed by a successful 'red' season. The Abrolhos catch remained at about 1.6 million kg, 
but the coastal fishery, especially south of latitude 30" S, provided the industry with very 
high catches. 
The level of catch each year is predicted by the Fisheries Department following analysis of the 
puerulus settlement occurring three and four years before. Because of past years of heavy 
fishing pressure, which has removed most of the larger animals, the annual catch is now 
largely dependent on the annual recruitment into the size population. If the puerulus 
numbers are low the 'red' catch will be reduced three years later, and the 'whites' catch will be 
low the following season. However, if the settlement is high, the catch is also likely to be high. 
The exploitation rate 
The exploitation rate is a measure of the number of legal size rock lobsters caught as a 
proportion of the total number available to be caught, and determines the number of females 
that reach maturity and.breed. The fishery's dependence on the annual recruitment is 
evidence of the current high exploitation rate. Research findings estimate that about 60 per 
cent, and higher in some areas, of the animals reaching the legal minimum length will be 
caught within the first year. There will also be some natural mortality. During the following 
year a further 60 per cent, or higher, of the remaining animals will be caught, and so on. 
Accordingly, for every 100 rock lobsters reaching the legal minimum length, approximately 
85 will be caught, mostly in the first two years, while the remainder will die through natural 
mortality at a much slower rate. 
The exploitation rate depends upon a combination of the number of rbck lobster pots allowed 
to be used, the number of days on which they are pulled, the sizes and types of rock lobsters 
allowed to be retained and the efficiency with which the pots are used by the fishermen. 
(a) Number of rock lobster pots 
The number of pots allowed to be used has been reduced permanently through the 10 per 
cent overall pot reduction management plan which ended in 1991/92. For the 1993/94 and 
1994/95 seasons, there has been a further temporary pot reduction of 18 per cent. 
A reduction in the total number of pots allowed to be used in the fishery has the effect of 
reducing the exploitation rate, but not in direct proportion. That is, the effectiveness of pot 
reductions is reduced through increased usage of pots and any increase in the efficiency of 
_..- the fishing fleet. 
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(b) Number of days on which pots are pulled 
The total number of days available for pots to be pulled is 78 during the period 15 November 
to 31 January and 150 days during the remainder of the season, totalling 228. The average 
number of days per boat on which pots were pulled for the years 1980/81 to 1992/93, for the 
'white' (November to January) and 'red' (February to June) seasons and for the areas north 
and south of 30" S latitude are set out in the Table below. 
* The 1992/93 season north of 30" S was reduced by one month during the period January 
and February. 
The average number of days on which pots were pulled has increased appreciably from the 
early 1980s to the early 1990s. South of 30" S the increase has been approximately 19 per cent, 
mostly during the 'red' fishery, but also during the 'whites'. North of 30" S the increase has 
been about 12 per cent, again mostly during the 'reds' fishery, but also during the 'whites'. A 
comparison between the 1970s and the 1990s would have shown a still greater increase in the 
average number of days on which pots were pulled. In earlier years, the number of days on 
which pots were pulled was greater in the north than in the south. However, they are now 
similar. 
An increase in the average number of days on which pots are pulled increases the 
exploitation rate. 
(c) The rock lobsters allowed to be retained 
Since the commencement of the rock lobster fishery the rules have set down that all rock 
lobsters brought on board may be retained except those which measure less than the legal 
minimum length and those which are carrying eggs on the pleopods, ie. berried females. 
However, further constraints have now been introduced, for part of 1992/93, and all of the 
1993/94 and 1994/95 seasons, such that all setose and tarspot females have to be returned to 
the sea. Also, the legal minimum carapace length has been increased, commencing 15 
November 1993, from 76 mm to 77 mm for the period 15 November to the following 31 
January. Furthermore, there is now a maximum legal carapace length, initially 115 mm in 
1992/93 for all female rock lobsters, and now 115 nun for female rock lobsters landed south 
of Wedge Island and 105 mm for those animals landed north of Wedge Island. 
Protection of the setose and tarspot rock lobsters has the effect of reducing the exploitation 
rate for female rock lobsters and provides an additional degree of protection to the mature 
female rock lobsters and those reaching maturity. 
,..-' 
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The effect of the introduction of the lower legal maximum length is to reduce slightly the 
overall exploitation rate on the rock lobster resource and to reduce sigruficantly the 
exploitation rate on the large breeding females. 
( d )  Eficiency with which pots are baited and set 
A pot will catch rock lobsters consistently only if i t  contains appropriate bait and is set on 
grounds inhabited by rock lobsters. 
The use of fish, hocks and hide as a bait have long been established as the principal method of 
attraction. Artificial baits have been produced and experiments undertaken to test their 
effectiveness. However, they have been found to be not as effective as the natural baits, or at 
least not as effective per unit of cost. 
In the early days of the fishery, the fish baits were held in the pot by a skewer. However, this 
method has now been replaced by bait containers fixed within the pot. The quantity of bait 
being used has increased quite sigxuficantly, up to double in some areas, which would have 
occurred only if there was an understanding within the industry that more rock lobsters 
could be caught if more bait was used. It seems likely that the increase in the quantity of bait 
used has had the effect of slightly increasing the exploitation rate. 
The ability of a rock lobster boat to transport the pots to areas of highest density of rock 
lobsters is an important factor to be taken into account in understanding the exploitation rate. 
There are a number of elements involved, the most importint being the capacity of the boat to 
carry pots in rough weather, the deck space to hold pots, 'the speed with which pots can be 
transported and the electronic aids which assist in locating the rock lobster grounds and in 
reducing searching time. 
There has been a dramatic change in the efficiency of the boats in the rock lobster industry as 
a result of sigxuficant increases in boat capacity, speed and the use of sophisticated electronic 
aids. Although it may not be possible to quantify the effect on the exploitation rate resulting 
directly from the increases in boat efficiency, there is little doubt that the effect has been to 
increase the exploitation rate. The recent introduction of the Global Positioning System (GPS), 
combined with a plotter, is one clear example of the change in efficiency. The use of GPS has 
allowed deepwater grounds to be worked with greater accuracy not only by those who have 
traditionally done so but also by others who did not have the skills to move into the deep 
water with confidence. Any action which results in an overall higher catch by the industry by 
shifting pots more often or locating and returning to preferred grounds more readily results 
in an increase in the exploitation rate . 
Research undertaken by the WA Fisheries Research Institute, reported in a paper by Brown, 
Caputi and Barker listed in Section 10 of this report, has provided a'preliminary estimate of 
the increase in catching efficiency (fishing power) as a result of changes in boats, gear and 
technology, as follows:- 
"Our preliminary estimate of the increase in Jshing power between 1971-72 and 1992-93 in 
shallow water was 29% (0.5 to 2% per annum), in deep water 53% (1 to 4% per annum), 
and for overall efoort 36%. " 
In summary, the exploitation rate in the rock lobster fishery steadily increased in the years to 
1992/93, as a result of increases in both the number of days on which pots were pulled and 
catching efficiency, even though there had been a reduction in the season and a permanent 
pot reduction of 10 per cent. In 1992/93, and then again in 1993/94, further adjustments to 
the pot usage rate were introduced because of a concern about the high exploitation rate. 
The breeding stock and puerulus settlement 
Maintenance of the breeding stock of rock lobsters at a level which provides adequate egg 
production is an essential element in the management of the rock lobster fishery. 
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Rock lobsters in most of the coastal waters do not reach maturity until about two years after 
they have recruited into the fishery. Accordingly, the animals entering the breeding stock in a 
particular year are those which have 'not been caught during two previous seasons of high 
exploitation. 
Rock lobsters at the Abrolhos Islands and in the upper north coastal sector of the fishery 
mature at a much smaller size (mostly below the legal minimum length) than those in the 
central and lower west coast, and thus form a very important part of the total breeding stock. 
Scientists of the WA Fisheries Research Institute have estimated that the Abrolhos Island rock 
lobsters now provide about 50 per cent of the total egg production. 
The level of breeding stock abundance necessary to provide adequate egg production is the 
most important piece of information required for the sound management of the rock lobster 
fishery. However, for a number of reasons it is also the most difficult on which to obtain 
accurate data. Firstly, the abundance of rock lobsters can be measured only in relative terms, 
using the catch of mature females per pot lift recorded by fishermen in their research log 
books and by field staff as part of the commercial catch monitoring program. Secondly, the 
level to which the breeding stock can be reduced without affecting subsequent recruitment 
can not be accurately predicted before recruitment has been reduced for a number of years. 
Following hatching and early development in the open sea for about one year, the young rock 
lobsters settle, as puerulus, on to the shallow water reefs. The success of the annual settlement 
to inshore reefs is able to be measured by the number of puerulus settling on research 
collectors installed along the coast. This index of annual settlement has varied quite 
dramatically since the introduction of the research collectors. Poor years have been followed 
by good years thus indicating that the variations in settlement have so far resulted from 
variations in environmental conditions rather than a lack of egg production. This variability 
would tend to mask any decline in settlement associated with reduced egg production. The 
major environmental influence appears to be the strength of the Leeuwin Current and the 
winter/spring storm events. 
Although an index of abundance of the breeding stock is only-available at present from the 
catch per pot lift of breeding size female rock lobsters, it is essential that these data be 
obtained on a continuing basis and that an attempt be made to compare the present index of 
abundance with the index when the fishing pressure was very light. Increasing fishing 
pressure will, of course, reduce the breeding stock and also change its size structure. Large 
mature rock lobsters produce more eggs than the smaller mature animals. Accordingly, it is 
not only important to know the quantity of mature rock lobsters but also the size structure. 
The best research data available indicates that the egg production in 1992/93 was about 15 to 
20 per cent of the level of egg production when the fishing pressure was very light, and that it 
has been trending downwards in recent years. In terms of quantity, the research indicates that 
the current total weight of the female breeding stock each season is about 2 000 tonnes as set 
out in Fisheries Management Paper No. 55. The adequacy of this level of breeding stock to 
maintain recruitment in the longer term is discussed in Section 4. 
Recruitment into the fishery 
Recruitment to legal size occurs approximately three to four years after the settlement of the 
puerulus on to the reefs. The faster growing animals may enter the fishery three and a half 
years after settlement. 
There is a strong correlation between the numbers of puerulus settling on the research 
collectors, as an index of the relative strength of the puerulus settlement, and the catch three 
and four years later. If the puerulus numbers are low, the catch three and four years later will 
also be low. Alternatively, if the numbers are high, the catch is likely to be high. 
The high catches of 1992/93 reflected a high'recruitment to the fishery in that year following 
a high rate of puerulus settlement in 1988/89. The puerulus settlement was also high in 
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1989/90. However, in the subsequent years the puerulus settlement has steadily declined to a 
level in 1993/94 of about half the long term average. This will result in a series of at least 
three years of below average catches, ie. below 10 600 tonnes, in the mid 1990s. 
4 The status of the fishery in broad terms 
The catch in 1992/93 was one of the best on record even though a number of additional 
constraints on fishing were introduced. These included a legal maximum carapace length for 
female rock lobsters, a 10 per cent reduction in the number of pots for part of the season in 
part of the fishery and a mid season closure in part of the fishery. 
The management plan for the western rock lobster fishery has been amended from time to 
time, but has been based primarily upon a control on the number of boats and pots, a legal 
minimum carapace length and closures. Its implementation has resulted in a successfully 
managed and very profitable rock lobster fishery. The challenge is to ensure an equally 
successful fishery into the future in the face of on-going technological improvements in the 
fishing fleet leading to an increasing fishing pressure on the stock. 
Even though the catches have been maintained and increased slightly in recent years, there 
has been some concern that the increasing fishing pressure producing a high exploitation rate 
may, if  allowed to continue, result in recruitment overfishing. Whilst there may be some 
debate about the precise level of the exploitation rate, there is no doubt that the fishing 
pressure has increased significantly during the past two decades and that the compensating 
reduction in pots has not fully accounted for the increased efficiency of the fleet. 
Three inter-related issues which are important in understanding the status of the fishery are 
discussed below. 
Reduction in the breeding stock 
The fact that fishing has reduced the breeding stock to less than 20 per cent of original 
breeding stock is a major cause for concern. The rock lobster industry is important and 
successful. It should not be placed at risk by having the breeding stock reduced further to a 
level which may result in a reduction in the recruitment associated with that low level. 
There are already two indicators suggesting that the breeding stock level might be too low. 
Firstly, there has been a 50 per cent reduction in the puerulus settlement over the last 10 years 
at the Abrolhos Islands compared with the settlement levels in the 1970s, and this can not be 
explained by environmental variables. Secondly, the settlement on the coast, as recorded by 
the research collectors, has now been falling for four consecutive years. The falls are in 
general accord with a weaker Leeuwin Current but on no previous occasion since data have 
been collected has there been the present low breeding stock levels coupled with a series of 
four years with poor environmental conditions. 
Increase in the exploitation rate 
The increase in fishing pressure has resulted in a reduction in the breeding stock. However, to 
address this problem, the breeding stock can not be treated in isolation. The coastal rock 
lobsters are subject to one to two years fishing pressure before the surviving animals reach 
maturity. Accordingly, the overall exploitation rate must be given attention rather than 
considering only the fishing pressure on the breeding stock. 
The gradual increase in the exploitation rate over the history of the fishery has been the 
subject of management discussions on previous occasions. There has been a general 
recognition that fishing pressure was steadily increasing which led to expressions of concern 
about the effect on the breeding stock. In earlier years, data were not available about the level 
of the breeding stock compared with the level when fishing was very light. Now that the low 
level of breeding stock has been documented, and may be being reflected in the level of 
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puerulus settlement, the matter of the high exploitation rate needs to be given urgent 
attention. 
There have been four major attempts to contain the fishing pressure. The first was in the 
1970s which resulted in the season being shortened from 14 August to 30 June commencing in 
the 1977/78 season. The second was in the 1980s which resulted in a 10 per cent reduction, 
spread over five years, in the number of pots allowed to be used. The third attempt was in the 
early 1990s which resulted in the changes introduced for the 1992/93 season. None of the 
three previous attempts were judged to be sufficiently effective to permanently overcome the 
ongoing increases in efficiency of the fleet. Accordingly, further measures, including an 18 
per cent temporary pot reduction, were introduced for the 1993/94 and 1994/95 seasons. On 
each occasion, whilst there has been agreement on the need for conservation, there has been 
considerable debate and disagreement between members of the industry and those 
responsible for management advice, and between different sectors of the industry on the 
precise nature of the conservation measures. 
Neither the reduction in the fishing season in the 1970s nor the reduction in the number of 
pots in the 1980s resulted in a sustained reduction in the fishing pressure. This was not 
unexpected, as there were a number of ways available to the industry to increase the fishing 
pressure, and the natural response to the past reductions has been for the fishermen to 
increase their efficiency within the constraints of the season length and the pots allowed. 
However, the measures taken in the 1970s and the 1980s did serve to reduce the excess 
(latent) fishing capacity in the fleet. Each time that pot numbers and latent effort capacity 
were reduced, subsequent controls were likely to be more effective. Figure 1 shows that in 
1993/94, possibly for the first timeithe option of simply expanding real effort to use up latent 
effort has not been available to fishermen. The theoretical number of pots lifts, determined by 
the number of pots multiplied by the number of days in the fishing season (total allowable 
effort), and the actual number of pot lifts during the fishing season are not very different for 
the 1993/94 and 1994/95 seasons-The difference is further reduced when factors such as non 
fishing days (because of weather or full moon) are taken into account. 
Figure 1 
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It appears from the 1993/94 data that the measures introduced for the 1993/94 and 1994/95 
seasons have so far been more successful than the past measures in reducing the fishing 
pressure and thus the exploitation rate. The media release Bulletin of 18 May 1994 produced 
by the WA Fisheries Department Research Division sets out, in relation to the impact of the 
1993/94 management package, that:- 
"However, the catch to the end of January 1994 (the whites catch) was 
11.6 % below the last 10 year average. Given a good whites catch was predicted, this confirms 
that the pot reduction and larger minimum size components of the package had the desired effect 
of reducing the exploitation rate and leaving more white rock lobsters in the water. An expected 
catch of about 10,700 tonnes for the current season (compared to a predicted 11,800 tonnes) 
indicates the package is likely to achieve its principal objective of leaving uncaught an estimated 
1,000 tonnes of rock lobsters. The achievement of this sign9canf reduction in exploitation rate 
will enable greaterflow through of lobsters to the breeding stock in the coming years" 
There remains, of course, the theoretical potential for an increase in effort as a result of 
fishermen attempting to increase their catches by using more of the presently unrestricted 
inputs, such as increases in bait usage or gear efficiency, to counter the restrictions on pot 
lifts. 
Safe breeding stock levels 
The 'safe' level of breeding stock to maintain a fishery has been the subject of a number of 
scientific papers in recent years. The precise 'safe' level of.breeding stock cannot be forecast 
before the fishery declines. However, from an examination of a number of fisheries where 
there has been a serious decline associated with a reduction in the breeding stock, there is a 
general understanding that if the breeding stock falls below about 20 per cent of the pre- 
fishing breeding stock level, recruitment overfishing is likely to occur. The Exmouth Gulf 
tiger prawn fishery is an example. The fishery declined rapidly to an annual production of 
under 100 tonnes, from an average of 600 tonnes, after the fishing fleet reduced the breeding 
stock to approximately 20 per cent of the virgin level. 
If the breeding stock is low, the serious nature of the problem can be masked for a time if the 
environmental conditions are favourable to' a high larval survival rate. However, in the 
reverse situation of poor environmental conditions and low breeding stock, the risk of rapid 
decline in recruitment and further subsequent reduction in the breeding stock is very high. 
Some of the writers on this subject have proposed that, in the absence of specific data about a 
fish stock, a safe working percentage would be 30 to 35 per cent of the original breeding 
stock. 
The WA Fisheries Research Institute has considered the question of 'a safe level of breeding 
stock and proposed that it be at least 25 per cent of the d i s h e d  breeding stock level. This 
figure of 25 per cent represents the level present in the fishery in the late 1970s and early 
1980s. This was the period immediately prior to the introduction of new technology eg. 
satellite navigation, GPS and so on, and a period when recruitment was maintained in the 
face of a variety of good and poor environmental conditions. 
The management measures adopted for the 1993/94 and 1994/95 seasons have been based on 
the expectation that, provided the fleet's efficiency does not compensate for the control 
measures, they will lead to a rebuilding of the breeding stock over time. That is, the variable 
pot usage tailored to the level of recruitment into the fishery each year coupled with the 
specific protection for animals growing into breeding sizes should enable the breeding stock 
to slowly rebuild across all zones to the levels of the late 1970s and early 1980s. 
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5 Introduction to TAEs, ITEs, TACs and ITQs 
One of the principal management measures introduced into the rock lobster fishery has been 
a control on the number of rock lobster pots, and boats, in the fishery. This measure was 
adopted to operate from 1 March 1963. Since that date a number of additional measures have 
been adopted so as to define more accurately the pot as a standard unit of fishing effort. The 
pot dimensions are now regulated and so is the number of entrances, one only, and its 
position in the pot. 
The pot lift is used as an important measure of the fishing effort exerted on the rock lobster 
resource. The number of pot lifts does not equate directly to exploitation rate because of 
variations in catchability during the season and other factors such as the changing use of 
electronic equipment and skipper skills. However, at least during the 'white' season, from the 
opening on 15 November to the end of January, the number of pot lifts permitted has a 
significant bearing on the total catch. During the 'red' season the number of pot lifts has a less 
direct effect on catch but is still closely related. The rock lobster pot is, therefore, a unit of 
effort, and because the management plan allows the transfer of individual pot entitlements 
between licensed vessels, the pot can be considered to be a unit of individual transferable efort 
(ITE). Its use in fisheries management to control the amount of fishing is termed an input 
control. Assuming that all pots are used on all available days of the season, the total of the 
ITEs reflects the total allowable effort (TAE). 
The alternative to controlling the amount of fishing by gear constraints is to control the 
amount of catch allowed to be taken, termed an output control. Use of output controls 
principally involves the setting of an upper limit for the allowed catch, termed the total 
allowable catch (TAC). This can be allocated to licence holders as units of individual catch quota 
(IQ) and, if transferability is allowed the units of catch quota are termed units of individual 
transferable quota (ITQ). 
The general concepts of TAEs, ITEs, TACs and ITQs are discussed below. The western rock 
lobster fishery operates on ITEs, and much of the literature about sound fisheries 
management using an input control system has emanated from Western Australia where this 
system has been used extensively ih many fisheries since 1963. However, the use of ITQs and 
its perceived benefits are perhaps not so well understood in Australia. Accordingly, this 
subject of ITQs is considered in more detail than ITEs. 
Total allowable effort (TAE) 
The total allowable effort in the western rock lobster fishery is the total number of pots 
allowed to be used during the fishing season multiplied by the total number of days available 
to fish. As a result of the temporary 18 per cent pot reduction, all pots are now fully utilised 
which means that the pot usage can be regarded as ITEs which directly control the effort 
applied to the stock. 
Individual transferable effort units (ITEs) 
The rock lobster pot entitlement is an ITE. However, because of the increasing efficiency of 
the fishing fleet, the pot as a unit of effort can change over time. A rock lobster pot used in the 
fishery throughout the season in the 1990s will exert considerably greater fishing pressure on 
the stocks than a pot in the fishery in the 1970s. Accordingly, the exploitation rate on the rock 
lobster stocks can increase even though the number of pots in the fishery remains unaltered. 
Much of the discussion in Sections.3, "The principal elements of the fishery" and 4, "The status 
of the fishery in broad terms" has revolved around the use of rock lobster pots and the 
increasing efficiency of the fishing'fleet. 
One of the difficulties arising from the historical use of controls on pot numbers in the WA 
rock lobster fishery to regulate the fishing pressure was that there was considerable excess 
fishing capacity, or latent effort, available to the flcct. Although the amount of gear remained 
i 
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the same, the fishing pressure gradually increased as the fleet became more efficient and took 
up more of the excess fishing capacity (time). When the amount of gear was reduced, the 
effect was short term because the fishing vessels increased their usage of the remaining pots. 
This has been the case for the western rock lobster fishery in relation to the reductions in the 
season and in the number of pots prior to the 1993/94 season when latent effort was no 
longer available to the fleet. 
One of the principal reasons for moving from input controls to output controls in many 
fisheries has been the inability of the management system, including industry acceptance and 
the 'political' will, to control the increasing fishing pressure through the regulation of the 
amount of fishing gear allowed to be used. 
Traditionally, the control on fishing gear (TAE/ITEs) in the rock lobster fishery has been 
relatively static. This is understandable noting that if transfers are permitted, the gear, which 
provides an access to the fishery, assumes a value depending on the value of the fishery, and 
any change in the amount of gear allowed to be used is perceived by some fishermen as a 
reduction in the capital value of the fishing unit. However, to consider ITEs as a constant 
measure is likely to lead to excess fishing pressure on the stocks. Where ITE reductions have 
been used, the capital value of the pot entitlements have adjusted to compensate for a 
reduction in the total number of units left in the fishery. 
For sound fisheries management, the manager needs to have the ability to vary the TAE to be 
used depending on the state of the fishery, and especially on the state of the breeding stock. 
The TAE/ITEs is usually the principal management control, but it also has to be operated 
within a framework of other input controls such as closed seasons, size limits and the type of 
animals allowed to be retained. The management system should determine the approximate 
catch allowed to be taken in the ensuing season, and set an appropriate TAE to achieve the 
required catch. Under this system, where the fishing effort is set, the catch actually achieved 
will vary around the expected level depending upon the achal abundance of lobsters. That is, 
incorrect forecasts are, to some degree, compensated for in the catch actually achieved so that 
lower than expected abundance will provide a lower catch and higher abundance will result 
in a safe higher catch than anticipated. 
Total allowable catch (TAC) 
A control on the total catch allowed to be taken (TAC) is, in theory, a direct method of 
controlling the exploitation rate provided that the TACs are set at the appropriate level in 
relation to the stock abundance. Use of this output control as a management measure would 
require not only a decision on the method of determining the TAC but also decisions on an 
array of other matters such as the method of monitoring the catch, the law enforcement 
requirements and the method of data collection for the purpose of stock assessment. 
I 
Individual transferable quota units (ITQs) 
The use of individual transferable quotas (ITQs) as a principal management method is an 
extension of the concept of a TAC. The TAC, or TACs by zones, are divided in an equitable 
manner amongst those who have boats authorised to operate in the fishery, thus creating 
shares of the TAC or individual transferable quotas (ITQs). 
There has developed an increasing interest throughout the world in the use of ITQs in 
fisheries management. The basis for this interest has been (i) the recognition that for many 
fisheries the lack of controls on access has led to over fishing and (ii) the desire to increase the 
economic performance of the fishery. 
...- The Commonwealth Government's policy paper "New Directions for Commonwealth 
Fisheries Management in the 1990s" set out that "The Government's position is that ITQs 
should be the preferred method for managing fisheries. Their practicality should be examined 
before other management controls are considered." The southern bluefin tuna and the south 
east trawl fisheries are now controlled by the use of ITQs. 
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New Zealand has adopted TACs and ITQs as the cornerstone of its management strategy. 
This has resulted in the preparation of many papers and reports on the subject which provide 
a valuable source of information and guidance. 
In the USA, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration ( N O M )  sponsored four 
studies on lTQs resulting in the publication of the National ITQ Study Report. The purpose of 
the studies, which used four different USA fisheries as examples spanning a wide range of 
situations, was to explain the general principles of ITQs and show how they might be applied 
to those specific fisheries. 
In Western Australia, ITQs have been introduced for the snappe;, pilchard, abalone and pearl 
oyster fisheries, and thus the WA Fisheries Department has signhcant experience in 
operating ITQ systems. 
It is important to note that ITQs have been introduced mostly to overcome the problems 
inherent in open access fisheries. TAC/ITQ management has been judged to have benefits 
from biological, economic and social points of view. Dr Lee Anderson, in his 1992 overview 
document of the four USA studies has written:- 
"In summay ,  ITQs are a regulation tool that can simultaneously address the necessary 
biological aspects of management and avoid some of the problems of traditional management 
techniques. They can provide operators with the flexibility to increase their profits by lowering 
their costs (byfinding the most efficient way to harvestfish) and by increasing their revenues 
(by selling their products at those times and in those markets where prices are higher). This 
flexibility comesfiom the fact thatfisheries managers do not have to tell the harvesters how to 
operate. The manager's job can also be easier because he or she does not have to w o n y  about 
derby openings or about t y i n g  to figure out ways of keeping the catching power of a fishing 
fleet to a level that will not overfish the stock. By facing the allocation decisions a t  the outset, the 
dual questions of how much f o  catch and who can catch it are separated. This separation leads to 
a system which can provide incentives matching the fishing power of the fleet to the 
productivity of thefish stocks. " 
Dr Anderson went on to say that:- 
"This is not to say that ITQs do not have their problems. There are drawbacks, especially in 
certain types offisheries. One special issue is that lTQs are a new andfundamentally diferent 
way to manage fisheries even though similar concepts are used in other types of resource 
management. " 
Professor Parzival Copes, in a paper "A Critical Review of the Individual Quota as a Device 
in Fisheries Management" published in August 1986, provides a number of pertinent 
statements on the use of ITQs writing mainly from the perspective of moving from a TAC 
system of management to a TAC/ITQ system. One of those statements reads:- 
"The deliberate application of individual quotas (ie. quotas at the operational level as distinct 
from c o u n t y  quotas ) to achieve goals elaborated in recent theoretical discussions is still at an 
early stage of development, though there are now several fisheries - eg. in Canada, New 
Zealand, Iceland, Norway and South Africa - where this device is being applied. As yet there 
appears to be no adequate assessment of the results on which firm general conclusions may be 
based. 
The purported advantages of management by individual quota allocation lie in the elimination 
of important external diseconomics, both among those associated with open-access fisheries and 
those peculiar to fisheries subject to limited entry licensing. The guarantee of an individual 
quota - it is contended - means thatfishing operators do not have to race one another to secure 
their share of the catch as quickly as possible before the TAC isfilled and thef ishey is closed. 
When they are assured of their quota - so it is held-fishermen can take their time, spreading 
their eflort optimally across the entire season and using the most economical configuration of 
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equipment and manpower in the process. Gone will be'the need for competitive escalation of 
speed and fishing power, requiring large capital inputs and driving up costs unnecessarily. As a 
further advantage operators willfind little need tofish in bad weather or under other dangerous 
circumstances in order to keep up their share of the catch. In addition, harvest gluts can be 
avoided or reduced and a higher value of sales achieved by meeting optimally the time pattern of 
demand over the year of bothfreshfish consumers and processors." 
Not all of the purported advantages of an ITQ system described by Professor Copes would 
apply directly to the western rock lobster fishery because of the existing tight control on pot 
numbers in that fishery. Moreover, Professor Copes sounds a note of warning in relation to 
high valued species. He writes:- 
"Because of the strong incentive to engage in quota-busting, enforcement can be a serious 
problem in individual quota management. The problem is likely to be more serious, the larger is 
the number of fishing units involved, the more extensive is the geographical area over which 
they are dispersed, and the greater is the number of possible marketing channels for the catch. 
The problem may not be a serious one in an industrial fishery with few landing ports or 
processing facilities. The problem may be insuperable in a widely distributed small-boat fishery 
for a luxury species which may be sold over-the-side to a wide range of potential customers." 
The above statements by Professor Copes indicate that management under a TAC/ITQ 
system could theoretically be very advantageous, but ' its implementation poses many 
., practical difficulties. 
Professor Bob Lindner, in his specialist economics report prepared in association with this 
report, has set out:- 
$ 
"Economic theory suggests that reducing catch by reducing licensed pot numbers is likely to 
increase the average cost of effort because it encourages increasingly inefficient combinations of 
licensed and unlicensed inputs. As a result, realized resource rent will be less than potential 
resource rent, a phenomena known in the literature as "rent dissipation". Furthermore, any 
regulations which impede rationalisation of boat numbers operating in thef ishey in order to 
meet socio-economic policy goals will exacerbate this problem of ineficient input combinations 
and consequential rent dissipation. Likewise, regulations which restrict the flectiveness or 
'catchability ' of licensed fishing gear will also dissipate potential rent. Where such regulations 
restrict the duration or timing offishing efort, they may reduce the average return per unit of 
catch as well as increasing the average cost of effort, therebyfurther dissipating rent. Finally, i f  
past history repeats itself, there will be a continuing need over time to further reduce the 
number of licensed pots to offset the impact offishermen's ingenuity in exploiting technological 
change tofurther raise the effective level of effort. Such ongoing change in the regulation of the 
indust y would involve additional administrative, managerial, and pdlitical costs. 
The alternative approach is to abandon methods of management based on input controls for one 
based on direct control of output, or level of catch. One intrinsic benefit of catch control based 
management methods vis-a-vis' input control based management methods is that the 
effectiveness of the former in limiting exploitation rates and ensuring the desired level of 
escapement to the breeding stock is not compromised by advances in fishing technology nor by 
favourable changes in economic circumstances (e.g. higher prices and/or lower costs) which 
provide an incentive to increase effective fishing effort. Consequently, so long as the total 
allowable catch is introduced before thefishey is over-exploited, and is set at the correct level at 
the outset, there should not be any need for continual adjustment tof ishey regulations as is the 
case with input control based management systems. " 
The experience in New Zealand indicates that the rock lobster fishermen of that nation have 
increased the total value of the rock lobsters catch by fishing at a time appropriate to the 
market requirements. However, the introduction of ITQs has not constrained the exploitation 
rate, and at least in some areas the TAC is not reached each year. Also, the rock lobster 
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fishermen in New Zealand did not have any transferable rights before the introduction of 
ITQs. 
More recently, a TAC/ITQ system ,of management has been introduced experimentally into 
the southern zone limited entry rock lobster fishery in South Australia. However, it has not 
been in operation long enough to gain experience resulting from a decision to move from an 
existing limited entry rock lobster fishery to a TAC/ITQ system of management. One matter 
which is clear from the South Australian experience is that the equity of the allocation 
formula adopted was, and still is, the subject of ongoing and often heated debate. 
There appears to be no literature describing a move from a complex transferable ITE based 
limited entry fishery, such as the western rock lobster fishery, to a TAC/ITQ system of 
management. If, however, the limited entry system in Western Australia is not permitted to 
provide the constraints on the exploitation rate which are needed, and the TAC/ITQ system 
is therefore considered a real alternative, it is important to provide information from 
whatever ITQ or IQ experiences are available, such as in New Zealand and Canada, to assist 
the industry and managers to understand the consequences of moving to that system. 
Consideration of a movement to a TAC/ITQ system of management should not be regarded 
as a "soft option". There are many difficulties in such a system which parallel those in the ITE 
system, particularly when there is a need for annual changes in either the TAC or the TAE. 
Questions about the possible introduction of a TAC/ITQ system of management can not be 
adequately debated unless the issues are clearly identified and addressed in detail with 
specific reference to the western rock lobster fishery. 
The major issues which would need to be addressed are the:- 
Legal protection for the TAC setting authority. 
Method of determining the annual TAC. 
Allocation of the TAC between the zones. 
Units of quota to be adopted. 
Method of allocation of the quota units to those already authorised to operate in the 
rock lobster fishery. 
Monitoring of the total and individual catches in the zones. 
Effective enforcement of the ITQs to the satisfaction of those ih the industry and the 
public generally. 
The need to maintain the existing biological, seasonal and gear controls. 
Implication for the ongoing collection of research data to enable (b) and (c) to be 
accurately determined, and to assess the status of the breeding stock. 
Quota registration and transfer arrangements. 
Carry over of quota. 
-. 
...' The issues raised in this Section about TAEs, ITEs, TACs and ITQs are considered in Section 6 
in relation to the western rock lobster fishery. 
20 
Fisheries Management Paper No. 67 
6 The use of TAEs, ITEs, TACs AND ITQs in the fishery 
The liock Lobster Industry Advisory Committce holds strongly to the view that the risk of 
recruitment overfishing should be reduced by increasing the breeding stock to at least 25 per 
cent of the original level, which would require takmg action to increase the female breeding 
stock from its present abundance of about 2 000 tonnes to about 2 700 tonnes at the start of 
each fishing season. This represents the level during the late 1970s and early 1980s. To 
achieve this outcome, the growth in the exploitation rate has not only to be halted but the 
exploitation rate has then to be reduced. 
The reduction in exploitation rate does not have to be great but it does have to be real. This 
process was commenced some years ago, but strengthened for the 1993/94 and 1994/95 
seasons. A reduction in the exploitation rate may mean a reduction in the catch, but a 
reduced catch may not necessarily mean a reduction in its total value. For instance, the export 
of live animals results in a higher price than the export of other rock lobster products. Better 
handling of the rock lobsters and their capture at times when the market is strongest could 
lead to an increase in sales at the higher end of the market such that it more than offsets any 
reduction in the total catch. 
This Section examines the implications of some different approaches to future management of 
the rock lobster fishery. In each case, there must be an overriding principle that the 
management approach will have the ability to arrest the decline in the breeding stock and 
move towards its increase by about 700 tonnes. This does not mean that the average catch 
must be reduced by 700 tonnes, but rather that there be an accumulation of an additional 700 
tonnes of breeding females over a number of years. 
The reason for considering these different approaches for the future management of the rock 
lobster fishery can be summarised in the following manner. 
The management package introduced for the 1993/94 and 1994/95 seasons, incorporating the 
concept of variable pot usage (TAE/ITEs) to match incoming recruitment levels, was aimed 
at increasing, over time, the breeding stock to about the level of the late 1970s and early 
1980s. Two outcomes can be considered:- 
If the management package is shown to be effective in achieving its goal in relation to 
breeding stock abundance, a decision could be taken to either: 
stay with the current management system, using variable pot usage (TAEs and ITEs) 
and a season ending on 30 June, or 
consider variations to the existing management strategies’ which could increase 
economic efficiency and the total value of the catch by fishing over a longer or at a 
different time when the worth of the product was higher. 
If the research being undertaken indicates that the management approach for 1993/94 
and 1994/95 appears unlikely, for one reason or another, to produce the desired 
outcome, on a sustained basis, the management authority may have to act quickly at 
some time in the future to further reduce the exploitation rate. This could involve 
either a use of variable pot usage controls (TAEs and ITEs) or the use of catch controls 
(TACs and ITQs). However, it is likely that under these circumstances of required 
reduction in the exploitation rate, the use of TACs and ITQs would come under 
increased consideration. 
It is worth noting here that, as set out in the Section 4, the 1993/94 package appears to have 
been successful in achieving its objective of reducing the exploitation rate. 
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Important elements in the evaluation of the alternative management strategies are (i) the 
potential for increased value, (ii) the expanded use of TAEs and ITEs, (iii) the introduction of 
TACs and (iv) an extension of TACs to introduce ITQs. These are discussed below in the 
context of the western rock lobster fishery. 
The discussion on the further use of ITEs is not as lengthy as that on ITQs only because the 
general use of pot entitlements, its administration and law enforcement is already clearly 
understood by the fishing industry. The length of the discussion on ITQs should not be taken 
as a suggestion that the reader is being led towards this method of management for the 
western rock lobster fishery. Indeed, the use of pot access entitlements has served the 
industry well, and the further use of ITEs has the potential to be further developed and 
become an effective management system for the future. 
The TAC/ITQ system of management may not be well understood throughout the industry. 
Consequently, it is necessary to take time to discuss the issues involved in that method of 
management. 
The potential for increased value 
A specialist report by MAREC M Y  LTD (MAREC), prepared in association with this report, 
has demonstrated that the traditional catching pattern which results in very high production 
in December needs to be reviewed now that the industry has moved away from rock lobster 
tails as the principal market product. Any action which reduces the annual variations in the 
catch, spreads the catch more evenly over the catching months and expands the number of 
months in which the catch may be taken would have benefits from a marketing perspective. 
Readers are encouraged to study the MAREC report in detail because the information 
presented in that report is important for understanding the potential for an increased value of 
the rock lobster catch. The report Sets out that it was not the intent of the study to jus* a 
change in the catch flow by claiming a specific economic benefit, but to show by analysis the 
potential for deriving economic benefit. 
The findings of the MAREC report, contained in its Section 10, are included in this report. 
However, as an introduction to the findings, MAREC has set out that they are subject to the 
qualification that the base composition of the catch would be able to be maintained and that, 
"without jeopardising the 'potential of' the fishery in any way", (i) the catch could be 
redistributed, (ii) the season could be extended and (iii) rock lobsters less than the present 
legal minimum size could be taken in the winter and springs months. There was a further 
qualification that the management system would allow the taking of the smaller lobsters in 
the winter and spring months and that his would be successful in reducing the catch of 
'white' rock lobsters in the following season. 
1 
Principal findings of the MAREC report:- 
* Based on the 1992/93 season model the white's catch as reflected in the month of 
December has an extraordinary low worth yet it represented some 45% of the 
season's catch. 
* The market for the high worth live lobster was not catered for in the period July to 
November 14th of the 1992/93 season and possibly at other times when there may 
have been insufficient catch to meet demand. 
The input control system of management as it applied in the 1992/93 season 
together with its season closure effectively predetermined the catch flow 
irrespective of the needs of the market. 
* 
f' 
Other findings of the MAREC report:- 
* The worth of a lobster product can change at any time. 
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* It is theoretically possible a t  any time for any lobster export product for any size to have a 
greater worth than any other lobster export product for that same size although in practice 
certain export products have generally had a greater worth than other export products within 
specific size categories. 
* Live lobster, or any lobster product, does not have to be the product with the highest worth at all 
times or any particular time for it to be relevant to the maximisation of the worth of the catch. 
Its relevance depends upon its relative worth within any catch size categoy and whether it is 
choice of processing in this product form or some other product form which has a lower worth. 
* Live lobster in the 1992/93 season in general provided a higher worth per catch kilo for any size 
category than alternative products. Small frozen boiled red lobster have in general been the 
second most valuable product and from time to time although not necessarily in the 1992/93 
season have provided a higher worth than live lobster for the same size category. 
* To maximise the worth of the season’s catch it is necessa y to produce the maximum weight of 
those products with the highest worth. 
* To produce the maximum weight of the products with the highest worth it is necessary to 
deliver a catch at the time when it has the highest potential worth. 
* It is not possible to accurately predetermine the catch flow that provides the maximum worth 
for the catch although there are some changes to the 1992/93 season catch flow that could be 
expected to provide important benefits. 
* Up until the 1991/92 season around 90% of lobster products have been produced primarily in 
frozen form and therefore if required could be stored and consumed at a later time. 
* Live lobster production at present is normally not stored for any length of time and is 
understood to be consumed a short time after receival. 
The characteristics of live lobster and the live lobster market ‘and the economic importance of 
live lobster in recent times has placed a much greater emphasis on when the catch is delivered 
from thefishe y. 
* 
* The catch f low pattern of the type that occurred in the 1992/93 season is not conducive to 
producing a high content of live lobsterfrom the catch. 
* A strong Iapanese demand for live lobster appears to exist in the months of July to September 
when the Westem Australianfishey is closed and this demand is now being partially met by 
New Zealand exporters. 
The taking of that quantity of undersize red lobster in the period from May which othenuise 
would become white size lobster in the following whites season would seem to be an efflective 
way to reduce the whites catch and at the same time replace that catch with a more valuable 
lobster. 
* 
* Extending the season results in an increase in somefixed costs. For the 1992/93 season these 
have been broadly estimated at $2.5 million to $3.5 million. Offsetting these are the benefits of 
lower interest rates, increased utilisation of holding tanks, market continuity for live lobster and 
the advantage of maintaining processing staff on a permanent basis. 
* Extending the season may result in an additional catching cost. This is the subject of a separate 
study and has not been taken into consideration in this study. 
The ’rush to fish’ results in a depleted catch in May and lune and as a result the lobster 
industry may not be takingfull advantage of market opportunities at that time. 
* 
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Further findings with regard to the 1992/93 season model- 
* The December 1992 peak catch substantially exceeded the requirements of the most valuable 
lobster product markets at that time and accordingly resulted in the production of a large 
content of the lowest worth products. 
The white lobster that represented the bulk of the very large December 1992 catch and to a lesser 
exfent the November 1992 and January 1993 catch, were commercially inferior to red lobster. 
* 
* The large December 1992 catch is understood to have placed cash flow pressure on the 
processing sector. Catch flow pressure may result in weaker processors liquidating producf at 
. less than optimum levels to obtainfunds to payfishermen. 
* In general the high worth of the catch in the month of lune 1993 resulted from a high 
proportion of live lobster obtainedfrom a relatively low catch andfrom a higher product selling 
price at that time. 
The MAREC report encourages the rock lobster industry to seriously consider the potential 
for increased value of the catch through a change in the fishing strategy to one which reduces 
the catch in December and allows fishing to continue beyond June in each year. Such 
consideration immediately involves an examination of the expanded use of the pot controls 
(TAEs/ITEs) and the use of catch controls (TACs/ITQs) as alternative management methods 
if the fishing strategy is to be changed on the basis of a potential for increasing the value of 
the catch. The expanded use of pot controls or the use of catch controls also have to be 
examined so that industry has an opportunity to judge their effectiveness and efficiency if the 
management package introduced for 1993/94 and 1994/95 is found to be not effective in 
achieving its goal of providing, over time, an adequate increase in breeding stock abundance 
and a more valuable distribution of catches throughout the season. 
The expanded use of TAEs and ITEs 
Those engaged in the rock lobster industry have had many years of experience of operating 
within the limits of pot usage limits. 
The decision taken in relation to the temporary reduction in the number of rock lobster pots 
allowed to be used by each operator in the 1993/94 and 1994/95 seasons is an example of the 
expanded use of TAEs and ITEs. Essentially, the TAE and consequently the ITEs (pot quotas) 
were used to reduce the exploitation rate, and thus the catch, in a high recruitment year so as 
to allow for a greater flow through to the breeding stock in subsequent years. 
An expanded use of TAEs and ITEs in the future management of the rock lobster fishery 
would involve a decision being made each year on the number of pots allowed to be used in 
the fishery to take the catch, or notional TAC, judged to be appropriate taking into account 
the level of recruitment, the state of the breeding stock and the array of other input controls 
already in place. That is, there would be a variable effort to achieve a notional TAC. 
However, if the recruitment was found to be higher than expected the catch would be higher. 
Alternatively, if the recruitment was lower, the catch would be lower. 
The essential element of the TAE/ITE system of management is that the number of pots 
allowed to be used each year could vary, depending upon the notional TAC decided upon. 
The use of TACs is generally considered in the context of an output control system of 
management. Accordingly, the discussion on the setting of TACs appears later in this report 
under the heading "The use of TACs and ITQs". ..J 
The adoption of this more flexible use of TAEs and ITEs for the sound management of the 
western rock lobster fishery would change the concept of the pots from a precise number to 
be used to a share of access to the available catch. For example, if the total number of pots in 
the fishery was 70,000, a fisherman with an entitlement of 100 pots would have an access 
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share of 100/70,000. This ratio of access share would then remain constant. If a management 
decision set the notional catch at 9,000 tomes for a season, and it was estimated, from a 
knowledge of the efficiency of the pots used by the fleet at that time, that the appropriate 
TAB was 50,000 pots, thc fishcrman with 100 pots would be able to use 100/70,000 multiplied 
by 50,000. The important fact would be that the access ratio would remain at 100/70,000. If 
fishermen purchased additional pots, they would effectively have invested to acquire a 
greater share of the fishery. 
A more flexible use of a TAE/ITE system would require a change in the perception by some 
fishermen of the status of the rock lobster pot entitlement. One of the factors involved in the 
debate on the temporary reduction in the use of pots for the better management of the rock 
lobster fishery has been the view that it involves a reduction in the value of the 'property' 
held by each fisherman. In a variable pot usage method of fisheries management, the value 
would still remain but be in the form of an access share in relation to the total number of pots 
allowed to be used. In this regard, it would be similar to the situation of quota units in a TAC 
system where quota units are constant but the permitted catch per unit can vary each year. 
An important point to note on the use of a TAE/ITE system is that because of the ability of 
the fishing industry to increase its efficiency over time, and thus increase the efficiency of a 
rock lobster pot as an ITE, there would always remain the requirement to take into account 
the growth in fishing efficiency when estimating the number of pots allowed to be used. 
Thus, in practical terms the average number of pots allowed to be used would gradually be 
reduced as the efficiency of the fleet using those pots increased. 
The report by Marec provides an example of the use of ITEs to increase the value of the catch 
if it were decided to allow fishing to occur during July, August and September. The example, 
using the 1992/93 catch data, shows that if the catch was reduced by about half in December, 
and that the quantity saved in December was distributed equally in July, August and 
September, there would be a considerable increase in the value of the catch, perhaps in the 
order of $10 to $20 million However, it has been estimated that to achieve this theoretical 
redistribution of catch, something approximating the following arrangement of pots in the 
water and legal minimum length would have needed to apply:- . 
(a) A reduction in the number of pots, by about one half, allowed to be used in December. 
(b) An extension of the season until 30 September. 
(c) A reduction in number of pots, by about 20 per cent, allowed to be used for the 
remainder of the season, ie. to the end of September.. 
A reduction in the legal minimum length from 76 to 75 mm for the months of July, 
August and September. 
J 
(d) 
An extension of the season of this nature could significantly increase the value of the catch. 
However, there would also be some additional costs for both law enforcement and research. 
Increases in research costs would result from the longer time period over which both the 
monitoring data and the catch and effort data would be gathered. Also, the managers and the 
industry would require the provision of advice with increasing accuracy on the number of 
ITEs which should be used each month to obtain the best value of the catch matched against 
the forecast markets. The WA Fisheries Research Institute would need to continue to gather 
information on changes in the effectiveness of a rock lobster pot. Accordingly, use of ITEs as 
the principal management method would continue to require an annual assessment of the 
proportion of the permanent pot entitlement allowed to be used each season. 
..' 
Increased law enforcement costs would flow from the need to have the fisheries inspectors in 
the field, both on land and at sea for three additional months each year. This would require 
the appointment of approximately five additional officers to ensure continuity of field 
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operations over the longer period, and it would also entail increased operating costs but not 
capital equipment. 
The use of TACs and ITQs 
The alternative to an expanded use of the TAE/ITEs system of management is the use of 
TACs and ITQs. Their adoption would be a fundamental change in the management of the 
westem rock lobster fishery as it would introduce output controls as the principal method of 
controlling the exploitation rate. Output controls are now increasingly being used in fisheries 
management throughout the world because of the increasing difficulty of gaining industry 
acceptance for controlling the growth in the exploitation rate through controls on the vessels 
and gear. However, the use of output controls has introduced a new set of problems for both 
the fishing industry and the management authority, mostly revolving around the setting of 
the TACs, the method of allocation of ITQs, law enforcement and the collection of research 
data for stock assessment. If there is not a large degree of industry support, the cost of law 
enforcement can be out of all proportion to the value of the fishery. If law enforcement is not 
effective, the use of TACs and ITQs is far less satisfactory as a management measure than is 
the use of TAEs and ITEs. 
An introduction to the use of TACs and ITQs was given in Section 5 of this report. In the 
following pages, their use in relation to the western rock lobster fishery is discussed. Firstly, 
however, it is necessary to discuss the use of competitive TACs as a management measure, ie. 
TACs without the use of ITQs. This is necessary because the measure is used extensively in 
fisheries management elsewhere and also because the estimation of the TAC is an integral 
part of operating both TAE/ITE the TAC/ITQ systems of management. 
Competitive TACs 
The introduction of a competitive TAC or TACs would, in theory, provide a direct method of 
further reducing the catch, and thus the exploitation rate. Whereas input controls rely upon 
their effectiveness in regulating the capacity of the fleet to catch rock lobsters, output controls 
such as TACs, require that fishing cease when a specified quantity of rock lobsters have been 
taken. To this extent, output controls are theoretically more effective than input controls in 
controlling the exploitation rate. This, of course, assumes that,there is an ability to assess 
accurately and forecast the exploitable biomass and to decide upon the appropriate TAC. 
Because of the sigruficantly different levels of recruitment across the range of the fishery, 
separate TACs would have to be established for the three rock lobster zones, (i) south of 30" S, 
(zone C) (ii) coastal north of 30" S (zone B) and (iii) the Abrolhos (zone A). The season for 
each zone would end when the TAC for that zone had been reached. Consideration would 
need to be given as to the most appropriate commencement date for the start of the TAC year 
SO that the 'white' rock lobsters were given some protection from the full impact of a 
competitive TAC. A commencement date of 1 February in each year would, perhaps, be the 
most effective. 
To provide an example, if the annual TAC for the western rock lobster fishery, established by 
the addition of the three zone TACs, had been set and controlled at around 9,000 to 10,000 
tonnes over the last five years there would have been a clear reduction in the exploitation 
rate. The average catch over the last five years was 11,260 tomes. To obtain an appropriate 
reduction in the exploitation rate over the next five years, the TACs would have to be set at 
levels which took into account the estimated abundance of rock lobsters following an 
examination of the information on puerulus settlement. Consideration would also need to be 
given as to the amount of 'white' rock lobsters likely to be taken and to the state of the 
breeding stock. It is important that these immature 'white' animals be afforded sufficient 
protection to enable a higher percentage to migrate offshore and reach maturity. The total 
management strategy would need to take this aspect into consideration. 
If, as an example, the TAC for a season was 9,000 tonnes, it would in practical terms have 
been derived from the TACs for the three zones, south of 30" S, coastal north of 30" S and the 
Abrolhos. It would, of course, be easier for a TAC decision to be made for the whole of the 
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fishery and that there be no further division. However, noting the nature of past management 
by area, and being aware that it would not be in the better interests of either the conservation 
of the rock lobster stocks or the orderly operation of the rock lobster fleet to remove the 
boundary lines, there would be little choice other than to decide upon separate TACs for the 
three zones. 
The staff of the WA Fisheries Research Institute would be able to provide data on which to 
make a judgement about the TAC levels for zones A and B which would be appropriate in 
terms of achieving the desired outcome of increasing the breeding stock over time. However, 
for zone C predictions are not yet reliable and a very conservative TAC would have to be 
provided. If the fishing strategies adopted by the fishermen in a zone resulted in excess effort 
being applied to the breeding stock, the TAC for that zone may need to be further divided. 
Whilst this is simple to set down as a process, the work involved in providing the information 
is complex and the degree of precision is variable. 
The setting of annual TACs is probably the most important on-going management decision 
required to be taken. It would, therefore, be necessary to appoint a TAC Committee 
comprised of representatives from the fishing industry, management and research. The TAC . 
Committee should report to the Rock Lobster Industry Advisory Committee. Depending 
upon the acceptance of the research data by the fishing industry, it may also be necessary 
from time to time to have an external review of the research methodology and findings of the 
WA Fisheries Research Institute. To be effective, such reviews need to be undertaken in 
cooperation with the research staff involved. Those who are involved in a research review 
need to be people of high standing in the research community. However, at the same time the 
fishing industry needs to have confidence that any review will be rigorous in its scope. 
The methodology for providing information and establishing the TAC levels should be 
determined prior to the introduction of a TAC/ITQ management system. Unless this action is 
taken, industry pressure on the managers or industry pressure on the political process will 
raise the possibility of changes to the TACs as a result of perceived increases in the density of 
rock lobsters in some areas. There should be a major review of the methodology every five 
years but, following a review of and agreement on the methodology, it should endure for the 
next five years. 
The legislation establishing an ITQ/TAC system of management would need to include 
adequate legal protection for the methodology agreed upon as well as for the TAC setting 
authority and the resultant TACs. 
Stability of TACs is more likely to be maintained in those areas where the annual catches are 
relatively stable, such as zones A and B. However, this may not be the case in zone C. In zone 
A, the catch in the last ten years has varied between 1,290 and 1,809 tonnes, but most of the 
catches have been between 1,500 and 1,700 tonnes. In zone 8, the catch in the last ten years 
has varied between 3,274 and 4,532 tonnes, although for most of the years the catches have 
been between 3,706 and 4,532 tonnes. In zone C, the catch in the last ten years has varied 
between 3,573 and 6,947 tonnes. In three of the years the catch was of the order of 3,600 and 
in three of the years the catch was over 6,000 tomes. 
The discussion on TACs has focussed on the commercial capture of rock lobsters. However, if 
either a TAC or a TAC/ITQ system of management was to be introduced, the commercial 
fishermen would certainly raise the question of the government's philosophy in relation to the 
future take of rock lobsters by the recreational fishers. Under the current rules, the take by 
recreational fishers could increase without there being an upper limit. The introduction of 
either a TAC or TAC/ITQ system of management for the commercial fishery would require 
clear legislation by government in relation to the method by which the recreational fishery 
would be controlled so that a TAC for the total catch, commercial and recreational, could be 
set and the sharing arrangements established. 
27 
Fisheries Management Paper No. 67 
The proposed procedure for the settings of TACs is set out in Attachment 2. Essentially it 
would follow the same basic approach as has been used for the assessment of other types of 
management strategies. Information on the annual puerulus settlement would be the starting 
point to predict recruitment. The recruitment prediction would be used in the fisheries 
models together with a nominal TAC to estimate the effect of that TAC on the estimates of 
breeding stock. The estimates of breeding stock would be compared with the target breeding 
stock abundance which had been accepted as an objective of management. The nominal TAC 
would then be varied and the process repeated in order to provide a range of alternative 
TACs and assessments for consideration by the TAC Committee. 
A competitive TAC without effort (pot) controls would result in ktense competition between 
the fishermen, each of whom would be endeavouring to gain as large a share of the available 
TAC as was possible before the TAC figure was reached for the area and the fishery was 
closed. 
One of the concerns about a competitive TAC is that it increases the competition on a daily 
basis which could lead to boat skippers taking undue risks at sea in order to maximise their 
catch. There is, of course, competition between boat skippers under an input system of 
management, but this would be increased considerably under a competitive TAC. There 
would be a move away from the concept of fishing being undertaken in an orderly manner. It 
seems likely that if a competitive TAC system of management was adopted, the fishing 
industry would very quickly seek to have the TACs further divided into individual 
transferable quotas (ITQs) so as to gain the theoretical benefits attributed to this output 
system of management. The use of a TAC/ITQ system of management is discussed later in 
this report. 
The Canadian Pacific halibut fishery provides an interesting example of the use of a 
competitive TAC system of management, although it is not suggested that all of the problems 
seen in that fishery would arise in the western rock lobster fishery. The halibut fishery 
operated under a combination of limited entry of boats and a competitive TAC during the 
period 1979 to 1990. A report published in 1992 by Mr Bruce Turris, Regional Halibut 
Coordinator for the Canadian Department of Fisheries and Oceans, sets out that the 
competitive TAC resulted in increasing short term effort. He writes:- 
”The side #ects of this race became increasingly worrisome and dangerous for the halibut 
industry. Thefishery grew shorter, shrinking to a mere sixfishing days in 1990from 61 days in 
1982, despite a 33 % larger TAC in 1990. Increasingly, safety was being compromised with 
vessels with excessive gear and crew fished twenty four hours a day in hazardous weather 
conditions because thefi’nancial costs associated with not fishing were too high. More and more 
gear was lost as vessels set too many hooks, fished in rough seas, or, set over by other vessels. 
Lost gear continued to fish, reduced future available catches, and became an increasingly 
biological and economic drain on thefishery. 
. 
The quality of the catch diminished asfishermen spent more time hauling and setting and less 
time properly dressing, icing, and storing the catch. Then, when thefishery closed, millions of 
pounds would be landed in less than a week resulting infish sitting on the dock for days prior to 
being shipped to the market OY placed in cold storage. Less valuable bycatch species such as 
rocvsh,  with a ZOO % mortality rate, were largely discarded so as not to take up hold space for 
more valuable halibut. In addition to the lost economic benefit, the bycatch was rarely recorded 
in logbooks and not available for stock assessment purposes. ” 
/’ 
The Canadian Department proposed that the Canadian sector of the pacific halibut fishery 
change to a TAC/IQ system of management instead of the competitive TAC. Eighty two per 
cent of the 435 halibut licence holders responded to a questionnaire and 77 per cent 
supported the IQ concept. Individual quotas were introduced in 1991 on a two year trial 
basis. The evaluation report of the trial, prepared by Mr Turris, shows that clear benefits were 
gained, including better quality fish, higher prices and safer fishing, by moving from a 
competitive TAC to a TAC/ITQ system. 
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The introduction of TACs in the western rock lobster fishery would require a change in law 
enforcement, both a t  sea and on land. The fishery would close by areas as the TACs were 
reached. This would necessitate some additional patrolling along the boun'daries dividing the 
fishing areas. On land, there would need to be a more rigorous collection of data from the 
processing factories so that the total catch by area was known on a daily basis. Also, the rules 
for the sale of rock lobsters would have to be amended so that it was illegal for a fisherman to 
sell rock lobsters other than to a registered processing establishment. This could have 
sigruficant law enforcement implications. Processors would have to be legally required to 
provide data to the Fisheries Department in considerable detail, and perhaps on a daily basis. 
The use of competitive TACs as a management arrangement would introduce many of the 
difficulties of an output system without providing any of the advantages. For instance, 
competitive TACs would result in a 'rush to fish' practice to a greater extent than is the case 
under the current input control arrangements. Also, in the 'rush to fish, the industry could 
increase the fishing pressure on the deeper water resource thus placing undue exploitation on 
the breeding stock. Competitive TACs are considered to be an unsuitable method of 
management for the western rock lobster fishery, and are not discussed further in this report. 
TACs together with ITQs 
As set out above, the introduction of TACs would, in theory, provide the most direct method 
of controlling the catch in the rock lobster fishery. However, if the advantages of an output 
method of management are to be gained, the TACs must be divided into individual 
transferable quotas (ITQs). In practical terms, each licence holder would have a share of the 
catch, expressed as a percentage, which could be translated into a catch quota as soon as the 
TACs for a particular year were announced. 
The setting of TACs by zones has already been discussed. The essential elements of an ITQ 
system which now require consideration are (i) the allocation formula, (ii) law enforcement, 
(iii) the need to maintain existing controls, (iv) research data for stock assessment, (v) 
registration and transfer arrangements, and (vi) carry over of quota from one year to the next. 
, .  
Allocation formula 
The major equity issue which arises whenever individual quotas are being considered is the 
description of the allocation formula. This is difficult enough when moving from either an 
open access or a competitive TAC to an ITQ system. It would be an even more vexed topic for 
discussion by those engaged in the limited entry rock lobster fishery because of the number of 
pots which have been bought and sold. Under the current arrangement, a fisherman who has 
a 100 pot entitlement has a capital asset as well as an ability to earn an annual income. The 
capital asset for 100 pots is the same for each fisherman in an area even though the success of 
using those 100 pots (ie. the catch) may vary greatly from one fisherman to another. 
If the allocation formula under an ITQ system was determined solely on pot allocations, the 
fisherman who consistently caught high numbers of rock lobsters per pot, through a 
combination of personal competence and capital investment in a high technology fishing 
boat, advanced fish finding equipment and navigational aids, may deem the formula to be 
inequitable. The fisherman could argue that historical catch should also be taken into account. 
On the other hand, a fisherman who consistently caught small numbers of rock lobsters per 
pot could argue that the allocation formula should be based purely on pot allocations so that 
his capital base was maintained. He could further argue that it was the fishermen who 
consistently caught high numbers of rock lobsters per pot who had caused the increase in the 
exploitation rate on the stocks of rock lobsters and that they should bear the burden of the 
reduction in the catch. 
An examination of the catch per pot for each boat in 1990-91 for the three areas has shown 
that there is a high degree of variation between boats, but that there are no clearly defined 
peaks. The data are set out in Attachment 3. To take an example, for zone B fishermen (ie. 
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north coastal), the average boat caught approximately 150 kg per pot for the season. 
However, five boats caught less than 100 kg per pot and thirteen boats caught more than 200 
kg per pot. The variation in the catch per pot cannot be attributed wholly to the fact that there 
are smaller and larger boats in the industry. An examination of the catch per pot for all sizes 
of boats operating in the 1985/86, 1989/90 and 1992/93 seasons (Attachment 4) shows that 
for 1985/86 and 1989/90 there was no statistical difference in the average catch per pot per 
season based on pot holdings. That is, the boats with smaller pot holdings did not seem to be 
either more or less efficient at catching lobsters than the vessels with larger pot holdings. In 
the 1992/93 season, the boats with the larger pot quotas did catch more than those with 
smaller quotas. However, in that year there was a very high catch from the Big Bank area 
which would have favoured the larger boats. An examination of the zone C catch per pot 
against pot quotas for 1992/93 does not show the same degree of increase in favour of the 
larger boats (Attachment 4). 
The point being made is that the large difference in the catches per pot per season shown in 
Attachment 3 can not be attributed to any marked degree to the size of the boat, accept 
perhaps when catches in the Big Bank area are involved. It is likely, therefore, that further 
examination of the data would show that there was considerable variation in the catches per 
pot over a season for boats of the same size. This would be the source of considerable debate 
when the determination of an equitable allocation formula was being attempted. 
The case study on the Canadian halibut IQ fishery has an interesting statement on the 
determination of an allocation formula. Mr Turris writes:- 
"In January of 1990 thefirst Halibut Advisory Board (HAD) meeting was held and lasted four 
days. The focus of the meeting was the allocation formula. A t  one point, 17 different allocation 
proposals were on the table. Everything from equal shares, pounds per foot of vessel length, 
auctions, historical performance, and shares based on the number of crew was discussed. By the 
fourfh day HAB members had negotiated tirelessly down to two basic allocation formulas. One 
formula was supported by the relatively small and historically non-productive (in terms of 
landed halibut weight) vessels in the fleet. The other was supported by the vessel owners 
historically and consistently recording the largest catch " 
Eventually the halibut industry members arrived at a compromise formula. 
The important point from the halibut case study is that the formula was determined by the 
industry and not by Government. This is most important and should be an essential process 
if an ITQ system of management was to be used in the western rock lobster fishery. However, 
in considering the merits of each approach, industry would need to take into account the 
current financial arrangements in relation to the ownership and leasing of rock lobster pots. 
For'the purpose of the discussion oh the TAC/ITQ system of management for the, rock lobster 
fishery, the TACs for zones A, B and C have been set, by way of an example, at 1,279 tomes, 
3,334 tomes and 4,387 tomes respectively which provides a total TAC of 9,000 tomes for the 
season being considered. In this example, the ratios of the catches in zones A, B and C to the 
total catch have been taken from the averages over the seasons 1988/89 to 1992/93. The TAC 
example of 9,000 tomes recognises that the annual catches will be lower in the next five years 
than they have been for the past five years. However, the figures are only for the purpose of 
the discussion. If a TAC/ITQ method of management was adopted, there would be a TAC 
setting procedure as discussed above and described in Attachment 2. 
There are three general forms of allocation formula which appear the most obvious for 
consideration:- ...- 
(a) 
This approach would fulfil the advice, offered by those who have adopted a TAC/ITQ 
system of management, to "keep it simple". 
Use of pot entitlements only 
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The West Coast Rock Lobster Limited Entry Fishery Notice 1993 has defined a "total pot 
entitlement" as the number of pots held under a rock lobster licence. The sum of the "total pot 
entitlements" is the total number of pots licensed for the western rock lobster fishery. The 
"total pot entitlements" are registered with the Fisheries Department. 
If a "total pot entitlement" for a licensee was 100, and the s u m  of the "total pot entitlements " 
was 70,000, the licensee would have a share of the fishery equating to 100/70,000. This share 
would become the ITQ which would not alter unless the licensee either increased or 
decreased the share by a market transaction. In reality, the share would equate to the number 
of pots held. 
If there was a single TAC of 9,000 tonnes (as set out above in the example used), the allowed 
catch by the licensee for the year would be 12.857 tonnes of rock lobsters. However, as 
already discussed, there are sound reasons for the TAC being divided into separate TACs for 
the three zones A, B and C. If a licensee operated in zone C, the allowed catch for that licensee 
would be determined by adding all of the ITQs for the zone C licensees, determining the ratio 
of the licensee's ITQ to the total ITQs for zone C, and then multiplying by the TAC for that 
zone. Putting this into figures, if the total of the ITQs for zone C was 36,000/70,000 and the 
TAC for zone C was 4,387 tonnes (as set out in the example used), the allowed catch by a 
licensee operating in zone C with an ITQ share of 100/70,000 would be 12.186 tonnes of rock 
lobsters, ie. 100 x 4,387 divided by 36,000, for the season being considered. For that season, 
the 12.186 tonnes of rock lobsters would be the annual catch allocation (ACA) for the zone C 
licensee with 100 pots. 
If the licensee operated in either of zones A or B, the allowed catch would be determined by 
adding the ITQs of the licensees and the TACs for the two zones and then proceeding as 
described for zone C licensees. However, there would need to be a further calculation in 
relation to the zone A licensees so as to determine that part of their catch which could be 
taken from zone A and that part from zone B. If the total of the ITQs for zones A and B was 
34,000/70,000 and the TAC for zones A and B combined was 4,613 tonnes (as set out in the 
example used), the allowed catch by a licensee operating in zone B with an ITQ of 100/70,000 
would be 13.568 tonnes of rock lobsters. If the total of the ITQs tor zone A was 17,000/70,000 
and the TAC for zone A was 1,279 tonnes (as set out in the example used), the allowed catch 
by a licensee operating in zone A with an ITQ share of 100/70,000 would be 7.523 tonnes of 
rock lobsters. The remaining part of the allowed catch of 13.568 tonnes by a zone A licensee 
would be taken in zone B, ie. the licensee would be allowed to take 6.045 tonnes in zone B 
and 7.523 tonnes in zone A. 
Use of this allocation formula would, in practical terms, mean that the ITQ share for each 
licensee would equate to the ratio of "total pot entitlement" to the s u m  of all the "total pot 
entitlements". However, the conversion of this share to the actual allowable catch may result 
in there being different annual catch allocations (ACAs) north and south of 30 O S for the same 
ITQ share. 
(b)  
This method recognises that both investment, measured as "total pot entitlements", and past 
performance, measured as historical catch, are important in determining the future share of 
each licensee in the TAC/ITQ system of management. It was the method adopted by those 
involved in the south east trawl fishery. In terms of mathematics the system is quite simple. 
The catch of a licensee would be expressed as a percentage of the total catch, and the pot 
entitlement of that same licensee would be expressed as a percentage of the total of the pot 
entitlements. The two percentages would then multiplied by the weighting factors decided 
upon for the two elements of investment and past performance. For example, if it was 
decided that investment and performance should be given equal weighting, each percentage 
would be multiplied by 0.5. The resulting two figures would then be added to provide the 
licensee with a percentage of the TAC. If, however, it was decided that investment was more 
important than past performance the weighting could be 0.8 in relation to the pot entitlement 
percentage and 0.2 in relation to the catch percentage. 
Use o fa  combination ofpots  entitlements and catch history 
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The data for pot entitlements would be the same as those used in method (a) described above. 
However, a great deal of thought would need to be given to the method of calculating catch 
history. If each licensee had consistent catches each year, the past performance could be 
measured by last year's catch expressed as a catch per "normal pot" and then multiplied by 
the "total pot entitlement" (see West Coast Rock Lobster Limited Entry Fishery Notice 1993 
for definitions). However, this is not the case, especially in zone C, and some form of 
averaging over a period of years would be required. If catch history is used as part of the 
allocation formula, the following matters would need to be given detailed consideration:- 
* The weighting to be given to catch history, and thus also to the pot entitlements. ' 
* The method by which catch history would be determined, including the number of 
years of data to be considered. In essence, the greater the variability in catches the 
greater the number of years required to provide an equitable averaging process. 
* The method by which catch history would be considered in cases where boat sale, 
leases or replacements had taken place. 
* The method by which catch history would be considered in cases where a boat had 
been not operated for a season or part of a season. . 
* The method by which catch history would be considered in cases where the number of 
pots attaching to a licence had changed during the years for which catch history was 
being considered. 
* The method by which catch history would be considered in the variety of 
circumstances resulting in either low catches or fishing being not undertaken. 
* Acceptance that the catch data held by the Fisheries Department would be the 
validated data on which decisions would be made, but if this was not the case, 
acceptance of both the method by which the catch history would be validated and the 
appeal process. 
* The legal implications, if any, of adopting the data held by the Fisheries Department as 
the validated data. 
* If the data held by the Fisheries Department were not accepted as validated data, the 
cost involved in determining validated data, including the cost of the appeal process. 
I 
All of the matters listed above are capable of definition if it was decided to include catch 
history as part of the formula. However, the matters on which industry agreement would 
need to be reached would be substantial. Perhaps the most vexed question would be the 
weighting to be given to the catch history. It is unlikely that there would be unanimous 
agreement on this point. 
(c) 
This method uses both catch history and pot entitlements, but allows each licensee to choose 
their preferred method of allocation, ie. catch history or pot entitlements. The method was 
developed by the Department of Primary Industries in South Australia, and has been used in 
the first year of allocation in the South Australian southern zone rock lobster fishery. 
A licensee who caught less than the average catch per pot would opt to use the pot 
entitlement in the calculation of the share of the TAC, expressed as  a percentage. Such a 
licensee with a pot entitlement of 100 would have 100/70,000, expressed as a percentage, as 
an initial ITQ. However, a licensee who caught higher than the average catch per pot would 
opt to use the catch history. Such a licensee would obtain an initial ITQ by expressing as a 
percentage the catch of the licensee compared with the total catch. Clearly, under this system 
Use of the Adjusted Preferred Method 
.,I' 
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the total of all of the ITQ percentages would add to a figure greater than 100. Consequently, 
each initial ITQ would be reduced by the same fraction to reduce the total of all of the ~ Q S ,  
expressed as percentages, to 100 per cent. 
The advantage of this method, if catch history is to be used, is that a decision would not be 
required as to the weighting to be given to catch history. It also means that some of the 
difficulties about the use of catch history could be avoided. There could be a simple rule that 
where catch history caused a complication, the licensee was required to use pots in 
determining the initial ITQ. 
Set out below are some very simple examples of the use of the three different allocation 
formula taking a sample of 5 boats (A, B, C, D and E) each..with pot entitlements of 100 (total 
500 pots) and catches of 60, 80, 100, 120 and 140 kg respectively, totalling 500 kg. The 
resultant ITQs are expressed as a percentage of the TAC. 
P&C, 0.5,O.S P&C, 0.8,0.2 APM 
16.00 18.40 17.86 
18.00 19.20 17.86 
20.00 20.00 17.86 
22.00 20.80 21.43 




Use of pot entitlements only (Pots). 
Each boat would have an ITQ of 100/500, ie. 20 YO of the TAC. 
Use of pots entitlements and catch history (P&C). 
(a) Using a weighting of 0.5 for pots and 0.5 for catch history. 
Boat A: 0.5 x l00/500 (pots) + 0.5 x 60/500 (catch) = 0.16, or 16 YO of the TAC. 
Boat B: 0.5 x 100/500 + 0.5 x 80/100 = 0.18, or 18 YO of the TAC. 
Boat C = 20 YO, Boat D = 22 YO, Boat E = 24 YO of the TAC. 
@) Using a weighting of 0.8 for pots and 0.2 for catch history. 
Boat A 0.8 x 100/500 + 0.2 x 60/500 = 0.184, or 18.4 YO of the TAC. 
Boat B = 19.2 YO, Boat C = 20 YO, Boat D = 20.8 YO, Boat E = 21.6 % of the TAC. 
Use of the Adjusted Preferred Method (APM) 
Boat A: Selects pots (low catch). The ratio is 100/500 (pots) = 0.2. 
Boat 8: Selects pots (low catch). The ratio is 100/500 (pots) = 0.2. 
Boat C: Selects either pots or catch because each produces a ratio of 0.2. 
Boat D: Selects catch (high catch). The ratio is 120/500 (catch) = 0.24. 
Boat E: Selects catch (high catch). The ratio is 140/500 (catch) = 0.28. 
The total of the ratios is 1.12 which has to be reduced to 1.00. 
Boat A: 0.2/1.12 = 0.1786, or 17.86 YO of the TAC. 
Boat B and Boat C are the same as Boat A = 17.86 Yo of the TAC. 
Boat D: 0.24/1.12 = 0.2143, or 21.43 YO of the TAC. 
Boat E: 0.28/1.12 = 0.25, or 25 YO of the TAC. 
The above examples are summarised in the following Table. Each figure is the ITQ expressed 
as a percentage of the TAC. 
Whatever the formula finally decided upon, it would have to be capable of precise definition 
in the legislation and precise calculation in terms of the data inputs. This is not only 
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important for the fishermen and the managers but also in relation to the appeal process 
available. 
The final result of an allocation formula is a licensee being entitled to a percentage of a TAC. 
It is important that following the determination of the allocation formula, and thus the 
percentage for each licensee, that the licensee's share, expressed as ITQs, remains unchanged 
unless the licensee takes a business decision to buy or sell ITQs. 
The above discussion on the allocation formulae can be summarised as follows:- 
(a) Three methods have been presented: one uses only pot entitlements, and the othei two 
use pot entitlements as well as catch. 
The most simple method would be to use pot entitlements. (b) 
(c) Use of catch data raises a number of questions which would need to be given detailed 
consideration. 
(d) The three methods provide different results in relation to each licensee's share (ITQ) of 
the TAC. 
(e) Although the ITQs would be determined for each licensee using data from the total 
fishery, the use of TACs for the three zones would mean that an ITQ converted to an 
ACA south of 30" S may not be the same as an ITQ converted to an ACA north of 30" S. 
Law Enforcement 
Law enforcement is one of the major issues for consideration under a TAC/ITQ system. 
Unless law enforcement is effective, the benefits ascribed to the use of ITQs are dissipated, 
especially in relation to its value as a mechanism for controlling the exploitation rate. In fact, 
if there is limited compliance with an ITQ system, its use is counterproductive. Two examples 
are set out below, one under a TAE/ITE system and one under a TAC/ITQ system:- 
(a) Consider a TAE/ITE system in which the catch being expected by management is 
10,500 tomes but through heavier than expected fishing pressure the catch taken is 
12,000 tomes. 
The result is that over exploitation has occurred to the detriment of the fishery, but the 
catch level is accurately known as it has been taken legally. The outcome is likely to be 
industry and management working together to reduce the exploitation rate through a 
more conservative use of the ITE system. I 
(b) Consider a TAC/ITQ system in which the TAC has been set at 10,500 tomes but 
through quota busting the catch taken is 12,000 tomes. ' 
The result is that over exploitation has occurred because of illegal activities on the part 
of some of the fishermen, but the actual over run is not accurately known. The outcome 
is likely to be some very costly legal proceedings, and a great deal of criticism of the 
managers and the fisheries inspectors by those fishermen who have operated within 
the ITQ laws. This would lead to a lack of confidence in the TAC/ITQ system, a 
breakdown in corporate management between industry and government and an 
inability to set precisely the future TACs. 
/' 
A sound compliance system which ensures that both the TACs and the ITQs are operated in 
conformity with the law is essential. This is not to say that some fishermen will not 
endeavour to operate outside the rules. However, the likelihood of an offence being detected 
must be high and the penalty for an offence against the quota management system must also 
be high. 
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The requirement for sound monitoring and enforcement has been identified as a crucial 
element by all those who have had experience in a TAC/ITQ system of management. An 
extract from the Overview Document entitled "Consideration of the Potential Use of 
Individual Transferable Quotas in US Fisheries" by Dr Anderson provides a useful summary 
on this subject:- 
" A  fisheries management program is only as good as its monitoring and enforcement system. 
This is as true of ITQs as of other types of management. However, there will be some 
fundamental diferences in the formulation and operation of a suitable monitoring system for an 
ITQ program. ITQs are like any other TAC based program in that there must be a way to 
monitor total harvest and to ensure that it does not surpass the TAC. In addition, however, it is 
necessa y to monitor the harvest of each participant and to ensure that it does not surpass his or 
her current individual quota level. With transferability, it is also necessary to keep track of the 
current amount of individual quota owned by each participant. While these extra burdens may 
seem formidable, it is necessary to evaluate an ITQ management and enforcement system 
relative to those of other types of management programs and relative to the potential benq5t.s of 
an ITQ program. Will overall monitoring and enforcement costs be higher or lower? Even if the 
costs are higher, are the accomplishments of ITQ management worth it. 
The successful operation of an ITQ program requires that the monitoring system be seen as 
being capable of detecting abuse. Participants must be confident that others can not beat the 
system and thus diminish the value of their rights. In addition the participants must also know 
that the system will detect any misconduct on their own part so incentives to cheat will be 
small. However, this does not necessarily mean that evey fish brought to the dock and evey 
landing report filed must be personally inspected by an enforcement oficer. 
In-person inspections will still be important aspects of an ITQ monitoring system, but its 
ultimate success will require a computerised system of electronic reporting and data 
management. For example, both the harvester and the first fish receiver must f i l l  out 
independent landing forms that can subsequently be double checked against each other. 
Similarly a transfer of individual quota from one person to another must be vmjied in writing 
by both parties. The computer system should have a series of tcsts that can be runfrequently to 
verih the accuracy and consistency of reported landings and trades. 
The work of the monitoring agents will change under an ITQ prograrn:The emphasis will ship 
from checking the day to day operations of the fleet to monitoring catch levels" 
Professor Copes, in his paper "A Critical Review of the Individual Quota as a Device in 
Fisheries Management" sets out that quota busting as a result of inadequate law enforcement 
can be a real problem when output controls are used. In his lead up, to the section on quota 
busting, Professor Copes states:- "Ironically, when it comes to promoting individual quota 
management, its proponents often fail to apply the sharp insights gained in exposing the 
deficiencies of limited entry licensing." On quota busting, he says:- 
"For many fisheries, enforcement is likely to be one of the most dificult problems with an 
individual quota system. Obviously, there is a material, incentive for  fishermen to engage in 
'quota busting', ie. catching a larger amount of fish than the individual quota allows. The 
extent of compliance with quota limits will be influenced by such factors as individual 
conscience, community culture and social sanctions, effectiveness of oficial monitoring and 
enforcement efforts, severity of penalties on conviction for  infractions, and extent of gain from 
cheating on quotas" 
Mr Neil McLaughlan, together with senior staff from the WA Fisheries Department, has 
written a specialist report on the monitoring and enforcement requirements if a TAC/ITQ 
system was to be introduced for the western rock lobster fishery. The report should be read in 
detail to understand the full monitoring and enforcement implications of introducing a 
TAC/ITQ system of management. Mr McLaughlan has reported that the western rock lobster 
fishery would be one of the most difficult of fisheries to manage by way of a TAC/ITQ 
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system. The following extracts set out some of the essential elements in a consideration of 
introducing such a system:- 
"The principal issues involved with the need to ensure individual catches do not exceed 
allocated quotas can be summarised as follows:- 
* Even with expected restructuring, including quota trading to produce f m e r  fishing 
units and eventual movement to more cost efficient vessels, a large excess catching 
capacity will continue to exist. 
* The product has a high value and has a high market demand throughout Western 
Australia, in the eastern states, and as an export commodity. Unlike other WA quota 
species, ie. tuna and abalone, rock lobsters are easy to sell over the back fence or down at 
the local pub. 
* Rock lobsters can be transported over long distances without any specialised equipment 
[in a car boot] and can be processed, even to export standards, by cooking, tailing, 
freezing and packing, and can be held for long periods, using simple domestic equipment. 
The inclusion of illegally packed rock lobsters along with legitimate export shipments 
occurred in earlier years. 
* Collusion between catcher and processor to under estimate sales would be to the 
advantage of both and would be diffcult to detect without eflective monitoring, 
surveillance and audit investigation programs. 
. * . The transport of illegal product to the eastern states byfreezer trucks occurred during the 
earlier days of the f i s h e y  and would be more difictrlt to detect today because of the 
increased volume of general frozen cargo. 
* An expected outcome of ITQ management is that of increased export prices. This would 
inevitably push up domestic prices also and may assist to create an increased demand for 
lower priced black market or poached product at a time when product in excess of quota 
could be readily available. 
* Rock, lobsters can be landed over all but two hundred kilometres of the thousand 
kilometre coastline adjacent to thefishey and attempts to prevent illegal landings could 
befurther complicated by at sea transfers to recreational vessels. (There are about 50 000 
recreational vessels licensed in WA). A t  sea transfers would also serve to distance 
catchersfrom the possibility of licence or quota loss penalties. 
Profits from illegal activities would be sufficient to attract a criminal element. This has 
occurred in the eastern states abalonefisheries and in the New Zealand abalone and rock 
lobster fisheries where threats of violence against fishermen who complain and Fisheries 
Officers and their families occur. Once established illegal activities of this nature are 
extremely dificult to eradicate. " 
i 
* 
Mr McLaughlan has identified the monitoring and enforcement requirements under the 
headings of (i) quota registration, (ii) catch and receival documentation, (iii) computer based 
quota records, (iv) licensing of rock lobster receivers, (v) approved landing points, (vi) 
approved landing times, (vii) container specifications, (viii) container tags, (ix) publicity, (x) 
legal costs, (xi) staffing implications, (xii) staff required and (xiii) vehicles. He set out that it 
would be necessary to maintain the current field inspection staff and add other staff to 
undertake the recording and audit requirements. Mr McLaughlan estimates that the 
additional costs would be of the order of $2.0 million in the first year and $1.7 million per 
year thereafter at today's $ value. 
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Mr McLaughlan has made special mention of the collection of documentary evidence in the 
following terms:- 
"Expcriencc with quota r r r i i r m ~ : c n r ~ n t  system irr N m  Zealand, arid with the small number of 
quota managed fisheries in Western Australia has demonstrated that following the 
implementation of quota management, enforcement emphasis ships from relatively simple 
observations or investigations at sea, on the beach front, or at processing factories, which may 
involve the collection of evidence of a single event on a single day, such as the observed use of 
excess pots, to ve y complex investigations of quota avoidance practices. 
Investigations of quota management breaches may involve long term covert observations of 
productflowfrom vessels to processors, the need to seize and study relevant documents held by 
processors, transporters, quota holders, and boat skippers, and a need to study financial 
transactions between them for comparison against observed landings and quota records. These 
investigations can involve unannounced searches of business premises, and as fishing records 
arefrequently held at home by vessel owners and skippers, the search of private residences; and 
can additionally involve the need to search bank and otherfinancial institution records. 
The volume of documentary and other evidence needing to be submitted in the more complex 
quota management breach cases, and the increased number of issues involved, can greatly 
increase the length of time involved in Court hearings and, as a consequence, can increase 
prosecution and defence legal costs. The New Zealand authority has a budget of approximately 
NZ$2.0 million annually to cover costs associated with prosecution action alone" 
In summary, adequate law enforcement is an essential element of a TAC/ITQ system of 
fisheries management. Unless there is widespread support by industry for this type of 
management, adequate law enforcement would most likely be an impossible task. Even with 
corporate support by industry, the law enforcement cost is likely to be considerably higher 
than under an input control system. This has to be weighed against the advantages of a 
TAC/ITQ system in terms of the control on the exploitation rate and the ability of fishermen 
to determine their fishing strategies to a greater extent than is now possible. 
Law enforcement is so important that both management and industry would have to consider 
the degree of independent auditing required to gauge the success of the enforcement system. 
The need to maintain existing controls 
One of the matters which would require consideration if a TAC/ITQ system of management 
was adopted is the degree to which the input controls could be reduced or removed. The 
literature on ITQs sets out that one of the principal benefits to be gained from the use of ITQs 
is that each fisherman, having accepted the constraint of an ITQ, shpuld be allowed to take 
his quota in the most efficient manner possible. 
Clearly, the use of escape gaps in the rock lobster pots and the protection of berried and 
setose animals would be retained. A legal minimum and maximum size would also be 
retained, although the minimum size would not necessarily be 76 mm for the whole of the 
fishing season. The debate would centre on the need for a season, the constraints on pot size 
and design, and also on the boat replacement policy and the control on the number of pots. 
The decision on these matters would have a sigruficant effect on the law enforcement 
requirements. Mr McLaughlan has assumed in his report that the current input controls will 
not be changed, at least in the short term. 
Although most of the controls would probably remain in place at the commencement of a 
TAC/ITQ system of management, the guiding principal should be that input controls would 
gradually be removed unless there were clear benefits to the industry in their retention. It 
follows, for instance, that a fisherman should be free to make a decision as to how many and 
what type of pots he uses, provided the escape gaps remain effective. Also, the season would 
need to be flexible enough to allow the catch to be taken at a time which maximises the 
market opportunities. In brief, the system would need to change from one in which most of 
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the decisions were imposed on the industry to one in which each individual had a freedom of 
choice, within broad limits, such that their decision-making was based upon economic 
efficiency. 
The commencement of the fishing season for the taking of the year's quota could be retained 
as at 15 November so that each operator had the opportunity to take rock lobsters when they 
were most catchable. However, there would also be merit in commencing the season on 1 
February, except for zone A if matters of transport quality are still an issue for that area, so 
that operators were firstly able to take 'red' rock lobsters with the knowledge that they were 
able to fish the 'whites' later in the season if they still had quota available at that time. There 
would need to be a short closed season during the year and other controls to protect breeding 
female rock lobsters in spring and early summer. 
Research data for stock assessment 
The WA Fisheries Research Institute has provided a statement (Attachment 5) on the changes 
to the research programs and the additional information which would be required if 
TAC/ITQ system of management was introduced into the western rock lobster fishery. 
Under a TAC/ITQ management arrangement, the relationship between catch and the effort 
applied to the rock lobster stock by fishermen could be expected over time to change 
significantly, as fishermen modified their fishing strategy to maximise the value rather than 
quantity of the catch. Given that the catch per unit of effort (catch per pot-lift) is the basic 
measure of the abundance of rock lobsters used by researchers to assess the state of the stock 
(exploitation rates, breeding stock indices and so on), the expected changes in effort under 
TACs/ITQs dictates that alternative or additional data would be required to maintah an  
understanding of the status of stock. The need for additional data is strongly supported by 
overseas research experience following the introduction of quota management. Without this 
additional information the success of the management arrangements in maintaining the 
breeding stock could not be measured or guaranteed. 
The overall impact of the introduction of TACs/ITQs to the rock lobster fishery on the 
research division would be likely to require an additional $900,000 per year, in the initial 
stages, if full precautions are taken to ensure the availability of reliable stock assessment for 
ongoing management. 
The specific changes to research programs and the need for additional information under ITQ 
management have been considered by the Research Institute, and are discussed in 
Attachment 5. The matters of major importance, either involving a change to the research 
program or for additional information, and which are involved in the estimate of the 
additional expenditure each year, are:- , 
Total landed catch. 
Compulsory catch and effort, and the voluntary research log book. 
Monitoring on board rock lobster boats. 
Fishery independent breeding stock surveys. 
Puerulus monitoring program. 
Monitoring the catches of the recreational fishers. 
Estimating TACs. 
Data processing and analysis. 
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Readers are encouraged to read Attachment 5 in detail so as to understand the changes in 
data gathering and the additional data which would be required. 
Registration and transfer arrangements for ITQs 
The WA Fisheries Department has provided a statement (Attachment 6 )  on a rock lobster 
register and transfer system which would apply if the fishery was to be managed by ITQs. 
The statement sets out that "government and industry requirements of a quota registration 
system are that it be a source of accurate and timely information on quota holdings and 
transactions. To do this a quota registration system must be of an evidential standard in 
criminal prosecutions and be able to interface with all aspects'of the Department's record 
base." 
Two concepts have been set out below for consideration and discussion:- 
(a) The first concept involves the use of two registers, one which records the number of 
units of quota owned by each quota holder, ie. the long term fishing right, and one 
which operates on a yearly basis recording the annual catch allocations (ACAs) after the 
TACs for the year had been set. The annual catch allocutions register (ACAR) would 
record all of those short term arrangements which did not include a permanent transfer 
of quota units from one person to another. All arrangements recorded on the ACAR 
would cease at the end of a fishing year. 
Neither an arrangement involving the ACAs nor the transfer of quota units would take 
effect until the appropriate transfer forms had been completed and recorded on the 
register. 
The transfer of quota units from one person to another during a fishing season would 
involve the completion of two transfer forms: one for the transfer of the quota units, 
and one for the transfer of that part of the catch allocation for that year which had not 
yet been caught. 
It would be imperative for enforcement purpose that theie be a nexus between the two 
registers. The 'parent' quota holding from which an annual catch allocation was 
calculated and fished must be able to be identified at any time during the season so 
that quota units could be removed as a result of a successful prosecution. 
(b) The second concept would involve the use of only one register, and operate in much 
the same way as the current pot register. 
The nexus between the number of units of quota and the catch dlocation would remain 
fixed at all times. Accordingly, unlike the concept in (a) above, there could be no 
temporary transfers, no matter how short the period of time might be. 
Each transfer of catch allocation would also require the transfer of the appropriate 
number of units of quota. 
Concept (a) would provide a greater degree of flexibility within the industry. However, it 
may be difficult to attach, back to the quota holder, penalties involving the forfeiture of quota 
which had been imposed on a fisherman who had leased a catch allocation. 
Concept (b) would result in a quota holder having to transfer units of quota to another person 
even if the purpose was to allow a small quantity of catch to be taken over a short period of 
time. This may be particularly difficult in the case of processing companies which, under a 
TAC/ITQ system of management, are likely to purchase units of quota as a means of 
retaining or increasing their competitive edge in relation to the amount of product processed. 
..' 
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In considering these concepts, the advice of those with experience in the operation of a 
TAC/ITQ system should be headed in relation to the essential elements of law enforcement 
and the requirement for severe penalties. It may be the case that the value of flexibility may 
have to give way to the need for an unambiguous nexus between the units of quota and the 
penalty of quota forfeiture. 
Readers are encouraged to read Attachment 6 in detail. 
Carry over of quota from one year to the next 
In some TAC/ITQ systems, operators are permitted to have some flexibility, of the order of 
10 per cent, in relation to the take of their annual catch allocation (ACA) in any one year. That 
is, a fisherman would be allowed to carry over up to 10 per cent of his ACA from one year 
into the next. Alternatively, he would be allowed to take up to 10 per cent more than his ACA 
in a year and have the same amount deducted from the following year's ACA. 
This flexibility is usually considered within the context of a multi species fishery because of 
the difficulty of being precise in relation to the quantity of each species landed. The 
administrative requirements of allowing an 'overs and unders' flexibility is quite complex. If a 
TAC/ITQ system was introduced for the rock lobster fishery, the disadvantages of adopting 
an 'overs and unders' policy would probably outweigh the perceived advantages. It is a 
matter of weighing the administrative and law enforcement difficulties against the benefits of 
providing each fisherman with a further degree of freedom in decision-making. 
In practical terms, if an 'overs and unders' policy was adopted, it would need only to cover 
either the possible excess quota taken in the last pull of rock lobster pots before the quota was 
met or the small amount of quota still remaining on the basis of it being not worth an extra 
days pull of pots. This being the case, it would be difficult to present a case for an 'overs and 
unders' policy which involved more than one per cent of the catch allocation. Accordingly, 
the administrative and law enforcement difficulties may well outweigh the advantages. 
On an associated matter, in some multi species TAC/ITQ systems a fisherman is permitted a 
lead time of up to 15 days to acquire quota if he brings into port a quantity of fish for which 
quota is not held. This should not apply to the rock lobster fishery. Any operator who took 
rock lobsters should have to possess quota to cover that catch prior to capture. 
If an 'overs and unders' policy was adopted, the residual or deficit of the allocated catch 
would have to be transferred to the following year's Register but would not be permitted to 
be accumulated. As set out above, if such a policy was adopted, it would be difficult to argue 
that the figure should be higher than one per cent. 
7 The size of the fishing fleet 
The Terms of Reference require that the ramifications of fleet size changes be assessed, 
including administrative, economic and social factors as well as the rules for pot transfer, pot 
allocation and licence splitting. 
The number of boats in the rock lobster fleet has been decreasing since the 1970s when it was 
decided that the owner of a boat would be permitted to transfer the pot entitlement from that 
boat to other boats authorised to operate in the rock lobster fishery. The gradual reduction in 
the number of boats in those earlier years has been hastened in more recent times as a result 
of the decisions to reduce the total number of pots allowed to be used in the fishery. The 
number of boats has fallen from an original of 836 to 638 as at  30 June 1994, and is still falling 
due to economic forces which dictate that a smaller fleet of more efficient vessels generates 
increased profitability. 
. /%' 
Some members of the rock lobster industry have expressed the view that a figure should be 
set as the minimum number of boats in the rock lobster fleet. The view is based upon the 
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general proposition that the rock lobster industry is important to the state, and that the 
distribution of a sizeable fleet along the coast benefits regional development and provides 
employment opportunities. 
A guide to a discussion on the fleet size can be found in the Mission Statement of the 
Fisheries Department and in Objective (d) of the new Fish Resources Management Bill. The 
Mission Statement includes the words "in order to maximise economic benefits to the state" 
and Objective (d) of the Fisheries Bill reads "to achieve the opt imm economic, social and 
other benefits from the exploitation of the fish resources". 
The inclusion of the words "optimum" and "social and other benefits" allows the debate on 
the fleet size to include such matters as regional interests and employment opportunities. 
However, maximising the economic benefits to the state may not be achieved by setting a 
figure for the minimum number of boats in the fleet. 
Professor Lindner has provided information, in Table 3 of his specialist report, about the 
relative net return per pot under a number of options of pots per boat resulting from 
decisions about the fleet size. Table 3 has been repeated in this report, and appears below. 
Table 3: Summary of results - accounting model (from Lindner 1994) 
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The base case for Professor Lindner's examination is a catch of 10,796 tomes (which is 
unsustainable), 188 days of fishing, 669 boats and 104 pots per boat. This provided a net 
return per pot of $466. If the catch was reduced to 9,000 tomes and the number of boats and 
pots reduced by the same proportion, to 558 boats and 58,031 pots respectively, the net return 
per pot lift in the fishery would remain at $466. However, i f  a management decision was 
taken to not allow the number of boats to fall below 669, the net return per pot would fall to 
$198. On the other hand, if the average number of pots per boat was allowed to increase from 
104 to 144, and as a result the number of boats was reduced by market forces to 403, with 144 
pots per boat, the net return per pot would be $846. Also, under this option the aggregate net 
return to the fishery of $49 million would be higher than for any of the above alternatives 
($32 million for the base case with a catch which is unsustainable). Table 3 bi the specialist 
report by Professor Lindner also provides information about the expected outcomes if the 
season was extended. Again, potential gains in economic efficiency through greater industry 
net returns would only be realised if the number of boats operating in the fishery was 
allowed to fall. 
Professor Lindner has concluded "To sum up, there is a strong interaction between policy on 
boat numbers and changes in industry net returns resulting from changes in other aspects of 
management in the Western Rock Lobster Fishery". Accordingly, any decision to adopt a 
minimum fleet size on the grounds of "social and other benefits" has to be weighed against 
the potential loss in profits to the industry. Not only would the industry profit be less with a 
specified minimum number of boats, but those profits would be shared amongst a larger 
group of fishermen than would be the case if market forces determined the number of boats 
in the fishery. 
The current rules set an upper limit of 150 pots per boat as a total. pot entitlement. 
Accordingly, while this rule remains in place, the theoretical minimum number of boats in the 
fishery is approximately 70,000 divided by 150, which results in 467 boats. Any figure as a 
minimum fleet size above 467 will have the effect, eventually, of setting a reduced upper limit 
of pots per boat on those operators who have not moved to the 150 pot figure. 
At the other end of the spectrum of pots per boat, there is a rule which sets out that a licensee 
shall not reduce the total pot entitlement per boat below 63. The basis for this rule was the 
desire by the management authority to ensure that the operator of each fishing boat had the 
potential to be viable. It was thought that the operator of a boat with only a few pots was 
more likely to over-pot than those with a larger number, thus increasing the inspection load. 
The figure of 63 was a matter of judgement. It commenced at 70 but was reduced when 10 per 
cent of the pots were removed from the fishery, and it is now less on a temporary basis as a 
result of the 1993/94 and 1994/95 management arrangements. The potential benefit, which 
had its basis in law enforcement, of having a lower limit should be examined in detail. It is 
likely that it will be found that the lower pot limit can no longer be justified. 
The debate on a minimum fleet size, and a maximum and minimum number of pots per boat 
is usually reduced to one of personal philosophy and judgement. On purely economic 
rationalist grounds there should be no,constraint on any of these matters. However, Objective 
(d) of the new Fish Resources Management Bill, "to achieve the optimum economic, social 
and other benefits from the exploitation of the fish resources" may result in other decisions 
being made. 
If it was decided to adopt a figure of, say, between 450 and 550 for the minimum fleet size, as 
a result of a consideration of the economic, regional and social issues involved, it would 
follow that there would need to be a maximum number of pots per boat although it would be 
open to debate as to whether this should be expressed as a 'normal' pot entitlement or as a 
'total' pot entitlement. It would also be a matter of judgement as to the continued need for a 
minimum number of pots per boat. 
..' 
42 
Fisheries Management Paper No. 67 
If a minimum fleet size was adopted as a strategy, one scenario could be a minimum of 450 
and a maximum of 550 (after the number had fallen to this figure through pot 
redistributions), but within that range the number of boats could vary to be as low as 450, by 
pot amalgamations, or as high as 550 by the splitting of pot quotas. This would allow a 
degree of flexibility but at the same time ensure that the fleet size remained between 450 and 
550 boats. In terms of overall management of the Western Australian fishing industry, any 
boat introduced into the rock lobster fishery as a result of licence splitting should already 
hold a fishing boat licence. 
The present trend towards a smaller fleet is likely to continue under either the existing ITE 
system or an ITQ system of management, although it would probably be speeded up under 
an ITQ system. The introduction of a TAC/ITQ system would, by definition, remove the link 
between the catch and vessel numbers but a management decision could, and no doubt 
would, be taken to ensure that a link was retained and also that there was a maximum ITQ 
per vessel. If this was the case, pots would be replaced by ITQs in the debate. However, 
under a TAC/lTQ system, the argument for having an upper and lower ITQ limit per boat 
may be reduced. The reason for this is that a decision to move to an output method of control 
would have signalled a desire by government to move from a form of management in which 
fishermen operated under an array of management imposed input controls to one in which 
more of the decision-making process in relation to fishing strategy rested with the individuals 
or companies holding quota. 
In summary, a decision on the minimum fleet size has to be a trade off between economic 
efficiency and social and other benefits which may be perceived to operate. In terms of 
economic efficiency, the introduction of a minimum fleet size rule would have the effect of 
reducing the total industry potential for profits compared with that which would apply if 
market forces determined the number of boats. This reduction in profits could be of the order 
of $15 million to $20 million per annum which would have to be weighed against the "social 
and other benefits" to be gained by setting a figure for the minimum number of boats in the 
rock lobster fishery. Those "social and other benefits" may include such matters as regional 
development and employment opportunities. 
A matter associated with that of the fleet size is the boat replacement policy in relation to the 
number of pots held. The existing rule is that the length 0f.a replacement boat must be within 
the range of the pot quota divided by 10 to determine the minimum length and 7 to 
determine the maximum length, but that the maximum length will not be less than 10 metres. 
The introduction of temporary pot reductions, such as for the 1993/94 and 1994/95 seasons, 
and the concept of variable pot usage requires that there be a reconsideration of the boat 
replacement policy. The industry has developed a fleet of speciavsed rock lobster boats. 
Taking into account matters such as safety, comfort and the equipment required on board for 
the holding of rock lobsters in a quality condition, there is no merit in reducing, over time, the 
average length of the rock lobster fleet in line with any reduction in pot numbers which might 
occur. 
Whilst there may be a case, based upon law enforcement considerations and perceived social 
equity, for retaining the current maximum size of a replacement boat calculated by reference 
to the "total pot entitlement", the question should be debated and determined on objective 
reasoning. If the decision is to retain a nexus between pot entitlement and boat size, there 
would be value in amending the figure of 7 in the "7 and 10" pot rule so that the fleet, on 
replacement, was maintained at the same general average size as currently exists. If this was 
adopted as a general principal, the examination as to detail should also consider the usage of 
pots within the context of "total pot entitlement" and "normal pot entitlement". If the 
extended use of a TAE/ITE system of management was adopted, which provided an access 
share depending on the number of pots held, the definitions of normal, surplus and total pot 
entitlements, as set out in the Fisheries Notice No. 620, would need to be reconsidered. The 
guiding principal should be to provide each operator with the maximum degree of flexibility 
consistent with sound management of the resource. 
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8 The effect of maintaining TAWITEs or using TAC/ITQs 
Although each reader will have his or her own ideas on the effect of maintaining the use of 
pots as the principal controlling mechanism in the western rock lobster fishery as opposed to 
moving to the use of a TAC/ITQ system of management, the following discussion raises 
some of the important issues which need to be taken into consideration. 
The timing of the decision 
This report has provided information about extending the use of the TAE/ITE system of 
management as well as the use of a TAC/ITQ system. If, as a result of the discussions 'and 
consideration of the issues, a decision is taken to retain the use of pots as the principal 
method of control, the opportunity would still be available in the future to move to a 
TAC/ITQ system if it became evident that the use of ITEs could not be applied sufficiently to 
achieve the desired outcomes. 
If a decision is taken to retain a TAE/ITE system of management, at least for the present, 
rather than move to ITQs, it is important that there be a clear statement about the use of catch 
data i f  an ITQ system was adopted in the future and if there was a possibility that catch 
history would be used in the allocation process. To not do so would lead to a risk that the 
future catch reporting in the monthly returns would be inaccurate on the basis of some 
fishermen positioning themselves to take advantage of an allocation process which included 
catch history. The ideal solution would be to establish the allocation mechanism, such as the 
sole use of pot quotas, in the event of the adoption of JTQs at some future date. An alternative 
would be to make a clear statement that if any catch history was to be used in the future it 
would relate only to the 1993/94 season and earlier. However, this alternative would, in 
practical terms, be quite unworkable and should not be considered further. 
The risks involved 
The adoption of TAC/ITQ systems of fisheries management has resulted from there being a 
general progression of decision-making from (i) open access to (ii) limited entry to (iii) 
controls on catch to ITQs. Some of the steps may have been passed over and there would 
have been various forms of input controls at all stages. In recent years considerable literature 
has become available on the potential benefits of a TAC/ITQ system of management, not only 
in relation to the control of the exploitation rate but also in relation to economic efficiency. 
Accordingly, when a judgement is being made about the most appropriate future 
management approach for the western rock lobster fishery, the debate is likely to focus on the 
realities of the current system, including its advantages and disadvantages, and the potential 
benefits to be derived from the alternative system without being sure of the strength of the 
advantages and disadvantages. Some of the risks involved are set out below:- 
(a) Estimate of the biomass 
Ideally, the management system should limit the catch relative to the total biomass of the 
stock such that there is sufficient escapement to maintain a safe breeding stock so as to ensure 
ongoing average recruitment. Where a TAE is set, with an estimated sustainable catch in 
mind, the actual catch and the level of escapement to the breeding stock will be a reflection of 
the biomass. This variation in catch will compensate (self correct), at least to some extent, for 
errors in the scientific estimate of the biomass on which the TAE was set. 
Under a TAC/ITQ system of management, the scientists would be expected to provide 
information as a basis for setting the TACs. The current degree of accuracy of actual catch 
against prediction for the rock lobster fishery is of the order of 90 per cent overall. However, 
the degree of accuracy for zone C is much less than 90 per cent. Accordingly, if the scientists 
were requested to provide information on TAC options for the three zones A, B and C, they 
would have to take into account the risks involved in relation to the best estimates of biomass 
available. 
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Considering the requirement to ensure adequate escapement to the breeding stock, and 
taking into account the risks associated with the estimates of biomass, the likely result would 
be that the average total of the TACs for the three zones would be conservative and thus be 
less than the catch under a TAE system. Direct setting of the catch by a TAC, while allowing 
the effort to vary, does not have any self correcting mechanism which can be of assistance 
where the rock lobster biomass has been over estimated. 
(b) 
The discussion under point (a) above is about the risks involved in the estimate of the 
biomass. However, even if this risk is eliminated, other risks have to be taken into account. 
Under a TAE/ITE system of management, the effectiveness of the fishing fleet in taking rock 
lobsters is likely to continue to increase even though the current temporary 18 per cent 
reduction in the number of pots appears to have been effective in reducing the exploitation 
rate. This would require the TAE to be varied to take into account any increases in fishing 
efficiency, as well as being varied to take into account the estimates of biomass available to be 
caught. 
The estimates of changes infishing power 
There is a risk associated with the use of a TAE/ITE system because of the ability of the fleet 
to increase its efficiency and thus increase the exploitation rate to a level higher than 
expected. This risk would have to be taken into account when setting a TAE. 
(c)  
The risk associated with compliance under the current TAE/ITE system of management 
appears to be quite small. However, until the introduction of the management arrangements 
for 1993/94, each action taken to reduce the exploitation rate, and hence the catch, appeared 
at best to be effective only in the short term. If the TAE/ITE system is used to provide a tight 
control on the exploitation rate, the compliance risk within the industry may increase. Also, 
as the price of rock lobsters increases, there is also an increasing risk of sales by 'recreational' 
rock lobster fishermen. 
The degree to which there is compliance with the rules 
The risk of reduced compliance under a TAC/ITQ system of management is unknown but 
could be very hgh. Mr McLaughlan, in his specialist paper on compliance, has drawn 
attention to the additional law enforcement requirements. It is difficult to judge the costs 
involved in ensuring that compliance is maintained at an acceptable level and it would be 
difficult to develop a monitoring system which accurately measures the level of compliance 
or illegal catch over the TAC. 
The compliance risk probably has a direct relationship with the resources of staff and 
equipment invested in the task. Mr McLaughlan has set out that 3, a TAC/ITQ system of 
management was introduced, additional staff and equipment would be required. He has 
included an estimate of the additional cost which no doubt would have to be born by 
industry. Mr McLaughlan has concluded his report stating:- 
"When estimating the extent of the increasedjinancial returns to the industry, which 
could be expected to result from a shift to a quota management system, it would be 
appropriate to ensure that allowances were made 'to fund further enforcement resource 
requirements should increased levels of illegal activity OCCUY in thefuture. " 
The risk of non compliance or, alternatively, the cost to industry of reducing that risk to an 
acceptable level must be taken into account in any consideration of the introduction of a 
TAC/ITQ system of management. The cost would involve not only the law enforcement 
aspects but also the audit system of monitoring the effectiveness of that law enforcement. In 
addition, a TAC/ITQ system would probably have the potential for increased activity 
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If there is a high degree of non compliance with the rules for fishing, the risk of overfishing 
the rock lobster resource is high. For instance, a 5 to 10 per cent leakage of product from the 
resource additional to the TACs set for a year would very likely lead to overfishing thus 
negating the objective of rebuilding, over time, the level of breeding stock to a figure of about 
25 per cent of the original breeding stock and maintaining it at that level. Where the catch 
exceeds the TAC, the subsequent legal TAC would need to be reduced to compensate if 
overfishing is to be avoided. 
Economic efficiency 
Under the current system of management, the "rush to fish' occurs to the extent permitted by 
the effort gear constraints, and can be controlled only by action taken by the management 
authority. Catching times and quantities can be controlled, but only on a fleet wide basis. In 
practice, such manipulation of the catch by controls on effort is not easily achieved in large 
fisheries, such as the western rock lobster fishery. This can be contrasted with the Western 
Australian prawn fisheries which are also managed under a TAE system but where there are 
only a few operators, and major market benefits and structural adjustments have been 
achieved. This is likely to be more efficient in terms of net returns to the industry. 
Economic theory suggests that the use of a TAC/ITQ system of management in the westem 
rock lobster fishery would not only provide the potential for an accelerated rationalisation of 
the fleet but would also allow the catch to be taken at more optimal periods of time in terms 
of market strength. This would lead to increased economic efficiency through greater net 
returns to the fishery (resource rent). A definition of "resource rent" can be found on page 1 of 
Professor Lindner's specialist paper. 
Economic efficiency is the subject of Professor Lindner's specialist paper which compares the 
alternative input and output based management systems in the western rock lobster fishery. 
Readers are encouraged to read the full text of Professor Lindner's paper. 
Professor Lindner sets out that in the western rock lobster fishery there are two major sources 
of rent dissipation:- 
(i) Input substitution which results when fishermen attempt to increase their 
catches by using more unrestricted inputs, such as increasing vessel efficiency, in 
place of the restricted inputs. 
(ii) Fleet redundancy, or .excessive effort, due to the fact that the management 
permits more than the optimal number of restricted inputs to be employed in the 
fishery. 
Professor Lindner has used a bioeconomic model to estimate the amount of rent dissipation in 
the fishery under a number of scenarios of pot lift limitations. He has concluded that:- 
"Among the various scenarios presented in (his) Table 1, reducing effort to 10 million pot lifts, 
and sustainable catch to 9.4 million kg, comes closest to maximising the mean value of realised 
annual resource rent (i.e. minimising mean aggregate annual rent dissipation). " 
Professor Lindner has set out that even with severe reductions in pot numbers, or equivalent 
'changes in other regulations, there will still be substantial efficiency losses in the form of rent 
dissipation. Any reduction in rent dissipation will be more or less offset by increases due to 
input substitution, or "capital stuffing". The amount of input substitution available in the 
fishery will no doubt be a matter for debate. If this is put to one side, the changes in net 
returns can be examined by Professor Lindner's accounting model. This was discussed in 
Section 7 in relation to the size of the fleet and demonstrated that if the number of boats in the 
fishery is not allowed to be reduced, the overall net returns and the net returns per pot and 
per boat, will be significantly smaller than otherwise. 
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Professor Lindner has then used a programming model to provide net return estimates for a 
number of scenarios under both a TAE/ITE and a TAC/ITQ system of management. These 
are set out in Tables 4 and 5 of his paper. The information from these two Tables as well as 
cost information from the specialist report by Mr McLaughlan and in Attachment 5 of this 
report have been combined by Professor Lindner to produce his Table 6.  
Table 6 has been repeated in this report, and a brief explanation of the information in that 
Table is set out below. 
The money figures are in $ millions. 
The "Net Returns" figures are the net returns to the fishery. 
The shaded areas in the TAE/ITE row are scenarios which Professor Lindner has 
judged to be unlikely to be attained. 
Except for columns one and four, the table assumes a policy of no constraint on a 
reduction in the number of boats. The average pots per boat is less than 104 when boat 
numbers are held constant at 669 boats. Where boat numbers are assumed to be 
variable, average number of pots per boat equals current levels (104) in columns 2 and 
5, and equals a possible 144 pots per boat in columns 3 and 6. 
Optimal pot numbers and pot lifts have been derived from the programming model. 
A judgement has been made that under a TAC/ITQ system it would be profitable to 
use more pots per boat, because the cost of pots would no longer be a sigruficant factor, 
and thus the number of boats in the industry would be reduced at a faster rate than 
under a TAE/ITE system. Accordingly, under a TAE/ITE system the number of pots 
per boat is likely to be less than would be the case under a TAC/ITQ system. 
Column 1, to take an example, considers the outcome of having a policy of setting the 
lower limit of boat numbers at 669, which was the base case in Professor Lindner's 
model. The difference between the net returns for a TAEhTE and a TAC/ITQ system 
would be $3 million. However, the additional direct costs to the industry for research 
and managements set out towards the bottom of the Table, would also be about $3 
million. Accordingly, under this scenario there would be no net benefit in moving from 
a TAE/ITE system to a TAC/ITQ system. 
Table 6: ITERAE vs ITQ/TAC comparison: programming model (from Lindner 1994) 
1 
9.870 10.576 9.694 9.870 9.070 11.702 10.576 10.576 
Industry Returns ($m) 16 169.0 5 164.4 16 164.4 16 185.0 $ 173.8 16 173.8 
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The estimated net return under a TAC/ITQ system with the season ending 30 June, 
and which neither constrained the market driven reduction in the number of boats nor 
required there to be a nexus between the catch and the number of pots after the initial 
allocation, could be between.$36 million ($39 million in column 2 less $3 million for 
additional enforcement and research costs) and $51 million ($54 million in column 3 
less $3 million for additional enforcement and research costs). This is compared with 
the current net return of about $30 million based on an average catch of 10,600 tonnes. 
However, this catch is not sustainable. If the average catch was reduced to a 
sustainable level of 9,000 tonnes, as used in Professor Lindner's Tables, the net return 
would be of the order of $16 million. 
The maximum difference in net returns, if a season is set to end on 30 June, is likely'to 
be the difference between the net return for the TAE/ITE system in column 2 (average 
number of pots 104) and the net retum for the TAC/ITQ system in column 3 (average 
number of pots 144), ie. $54 million less $29 million. The minimum difference in net 
returns is likely to be the differences within column 2, ie. $39 million less $29 million. 
The additional cost of research and management (approximately $3 million) then has to 
be subtracted from these figures to yield an estimated net benefit of a TAC/ITQ system 
of between $7 million and $23 million. 
The maximum difference scenarios for the season ending on 30 June or 30 September is 
set out under the heading "Upper Bound Estimates" in columns 7 and 8. For a 30 June 
season the maximum difference is $23 million and for a 30 September season the figure 
is $16 million. 
Based on all of the points (a) to (j) above, and taking the average of the $7 million and 
$23 million figures (average $15 million) set out in (i) as the estimated additional net 
return, the introduction a TAC/ITQ system of management for the western rock 
lobster fishery could approximately double the net return to the industry, ie. the 
average return under a TAC/ITQ system could be $15 million additional to the net 
retum of $16 million set out in column 1 under a TAE/ITE system. However, i f  a 
constraint on boat numbers was imposed and there was a required nexus between 
catch and the number of pots, there would be either zero or very little economic benefit 
to be gained by changing from a TAE/ITE system to a TAC/ITQ system of 
management. 
The model indicates that the option of extending the season to 30 September yields a 
substantial increase in net returns under either system of management, but that the 
benefit of extending the season would be smaller under ITQs than under ITEs. If a 
decision was taken to retain the input control system of management, an extension of 
the season until 30 September has the potential to increase the net retums to the 
industry by about $20 million ($49 million minus $29 million from columns 7 and 8). 
Under an ITQ system, extending the season increases net returns by between $14 
million and $17 rnillion. Hence, the economic advantage of ITQs over ITEs is less for 
the longer fishing season. 
It is important that readers understand the information provided by Professor Lindner in his 
specialist paper, and make their judgement in relation to the potential net return benefits 
which could flow from the introduction of a TAC/ITQ system and also the extension of the 
season under either a TAE/ITE or a TAC/ITQ system of management. In making that 
judgement, some of the important elements are (i) the amount of "capital stuffing'' likely to 
occur, (ii) the degree to which the number of boats will be reduced and the number of pots 
per boat increased, (iii) the likelihood of the nexus between boats and pots being removed, 
and (iv) the acceptance of the likely requirement for industry to pay up front the estimated 
additional cost of research and law enforcement. 
. 
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The possibility of increased ownership by processing companies under ITQs 
The rock lobster pots are mostly owned by individual fishermen or by family companies with 
a fishing background, although there is some investment in pots by processing establishments 
and other business interests. The concept of the catching sector being mainly in the hands of 
the fishermen may change over time if a TAC/ITQ system of management was introduced. 
Ownership of a rock lobster pot represents the opportunity to take rock lobsters. However, 
the success of doing so depends on the skill of the fisherman and the efficiency of the boat 
and associated technology. The catch per pot for one fisherman may be as much as twice the 
catch per pot for another fisherman. Accordingly, if a processing company owned a rock 
lobster boat to be operated by a employee skipper, its return on the investment could vary 
considerably. However, if JTQs were introduced the situation would change in that an ITQ 
would represent a specific quantity of live rock lobsters, and therefore a specific value of 
product delivered to the processing factory. 
The experience in New Zealand has been that since the introduction of ITQs for the rock 
lobster industry in 1990, about 30 per cent of the ITQs had been sold by April 1993 from the 
catching sector to the processing sector and other corporate buyers. 
In Western Australia, it seems likely that the introduction of ITQs would result in some shift 
of ownership from the catching sector to the processing sector and other corporate buyers. 
This may, in tun, raise the question of foreign ownership which is discussed in a policy 
statement issued by the then Minister for Fisheries in 1989 and published in Fisheries 
Management Paper No. 30. 
The attraction for the processing sector to own ITQs would be to provide leverage in terms of 
maintaining or increasing its throughput of product as well as well as controlling the flow of 
product. 
Cooperative management by government and industry 
The degree to which government and industry operate corporately in managing the rock 
lobster fishery depends on the determination of agreed objectives and strategies, equity in 
decision making, confidence in the stock assessment, effectiire compliance oversight and 
efficient administration. The following observations are offered on these points:- 
(a) Agreed objectives and strategies 
The Rock Lobster Industry Advisory Committee, which provides advice to the Minister 
for Fisheries, has been an effective forum for establishing objectives and determining 
strategies for achieving those objectives. This is an ongoing process, and would 
continue to be effective under either a TAE/ITE or a TAC/ITQ system of management. 
I 
(b) Equity in decision-making 
One of the criticisms, by some segments of the fishing industry, of the 18 per cent 
temporary reduction in rock lobster pots has been that the effect has not been equitable 
across all sectors of the fishery. That is, while the access share, through the pot 
allocations, has remained the same, there has been a perception, which may or may not 
be a reality, that the resultant catch has not reflected that share. The future use of 
variable TAEs under a TAE/ITE management system may continue to raise the 
question of equity in decision-making. This has the potential to divide the catching 
sector and make more difficult the corporate management of the fishery. 
A TAC/ITQ system of management provides each licensee with an established share of 
the total allowable catch. To this extent, the system may be judged to be more equitable 
in its outcome. However, the process of deciding upon the initial allocation formula, as 
set out in Section 6 of this report, may be judged to lack equity to such an extent that it 
became the major equity issue, and divide the industry for many years, thus affecting 
the corporate management. 
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Confidence in the stock assessment 
Irrespective of the competence of the research institute involved, debate on the state of 
the stocks is likely. That debate is unlikely to be a major factor in the corporate 
management process, but certainly has the potential to be an attributable factor. Under 
a TAC/ITQ system of management, the ability of the researchers to determine the state 
of the stocks is reduced compared with the ITE/TAE system where the unit of fishing 
effort remains relatively constant and standard. 
Effective compliance oversight 
Effective compliance oversight is an essential ingredient for a cooperative approach to 
fisheries management. Unless the catching sector was confident that the pot allocations 
or the catch quotas were being respected throughout the industry, there would develop 
a lack of confidence in the management system and a reduction in corporate 
management. As already discussed in this report, the risk of non compliance, or 
alternatively cost of ensuring compliance, in a rock lobster fishery under a TAC/ITQ 
system of management is high. 
Efficient administration 
An efficient administration would be expected. Irrespective of the management 
arrangement adopted, the administration is unlikely to be a major factor affecting the 
corporate management of the rock lobster fishery. 
The long term management of the rock lobster fishery will need to include a control on the 
exploitation rate, and to this end either a variable pot allocation or a catch allocation system 
of management will be required. Either system will have advantages and disadvantages. In 
deciding on the appropriate management approach, it is important to take into account the 
past history of corporate management by government and industry and the need for this to 
continue into the future. 
The potential to increase the value of the product by changing the season 
The specialist report by MAREC Pty Ltd has drawn the reader's attention to the potential for 
increasing the value of the rock lobster catch by changing the.season and taking slightly 
smaller animals. This could be accomplished by either the an input or an output method of 
management. However, consideration could also be given to the feasibility of holding 
animals at low cost past 30 June as opposed to fishing during the months of July, August and 
September on rock lobsters with a legal minimum length of 75 mm. 
The possibility of illegal 'recreational' fishing for rock lobsters 
The specialist report by Professor Lindner has demonstrated that the return to the fishery 
would be enhanced by reducing the number of boats and pots in the fishing fleet. This may 
have the effect of increasing the level of illegal activity by those not holding a rock lobster 
licence. The reduction in the number of boats would result in there being an increasing 
number of competent rock lobster skippers who did not have access to a licensed rock lobster 
boat. Some of these skippers may be tempted to undertake illegal 'recreational' rock lobster 
fishing if the potential returns were judged to be sufficiently high. This has been reported to 
occur in the New Zealand rock lobster fishery and also in the Australian abalone fishery. If it 
were to become a major issue for'rock lobsters in Western Australia, the rules which would be 
needed to give attention to the problem may affect all recreational fishing and thus require a 
firm political will. 
9 Discussion 
The western rock lobster fishery has been managed for the past thirty years by the use of 
input controls, the principal measure being the number of pots permitted to be used. Even 
though there is a high degree of corporate management of the rock lobster fishery between 
government and the industry with a common goal of the long term maintenance of the 
fishery, the lack of consensus in management planning has allowed the exploitation rate to 
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increase to a level at which recruitment may be affected. This is a cause for concern, and 
action has been taken to reduce the exploitation rate so as to allow for the rebuilding of the 
breeding stock. 
This concern about the breeding stock comes at a time when the market for rock lobsters has 
changed from the supply of frozen green tails to the USA to a market in which the highest 
price is paid for live and whole cooked rock lobsters. MAREC has provided a specialist report 
on this subject and drawn industry's attention to the potential for increasing the value of the 
rock lobster catch by a change in the fishing seasons. 
The requirement to reduce the exploitation rate, and hence the catch, and the potential to 
increase the value of the catch through a different catching strategy have provided the 
impetus to produce this report so as to assist in the discussions on the longer term vision for 
the rock lobster fishery and the most appropriate management arrangements to fulfil that 
vision. 
If the management arrangements for 1993/94 and 1994/95 are shown to be effective in 
rebuilding, over time, the breeding stock to a satisfactory level, the discussion can concentrate 
on a vision for the future management of the western rock lobster fishery either by the 
extended use of variable input controls, ie. pot usage and size limits, or by the movement 
away from input controls to output controls. If input controls are retained as the method of 
management, there would need to be an acceptance that variable pot usage (TAEs), or 
allocations (ITEs), which are the principal control units, would be varied slightly from year to 
year to match recruitment. Also, on average, fewer pots would be used because the 
effectiveness of a pot-lift is likely to increase gradually, and to offset this increase, if it occurs, 
the average number of pots allowed to be used would have to continue to decline. 
On the other hand, if the arrangements for 1993/94 and 1994/95 are shown to be not 
sufficient to rebuild the breeding stock, action would need to be taken by the management 
authority to further reduce the exploitation rate. This could be achieved through the extended 
use of input controls or by the use of output controls. However, the time frame may have to 
be quite short. If there was considerable industry resistance to a-further variation in the usage 
of pots, the use of a TAC/ITQ system may be considered the only alternative means of 
attempting to ensure that the breeding stock is protected. If this were the case, the TACs 
would have to be set conservatively. 




A clear understanding of the system by industry and management. 
An effective law enforcement program. 
! 
(iii) A continuing historical data set which is so essential for the stock assessment required 
as a basis for management decisions. 
The disadvantages of the input method of management are that there would be:- 
(i) A gradual increase in effective fishing effort. 
(ii) A reduction in the efficient use of the capital invested in pots and boats in the fishing 
industry. 
An increase in the constraints imposed by management on the decision-making process 
of individual operators in the industry. 
(iii) 
The advantages of moving to an output (TACs/ITQs) method of management are that there 
would be:- 
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(i) A direct control over the exploitation rate providing that the law enforcement program 
is effective. 
(ii) An ability of operators to take their catch in a manner which maximises the market 
opportunities. 
(iii) A potential to improve economic efficiency through an increase in the net return to the 
industry. 
The disadvantages of moving to an output method of management are that there would be:- 
(i) Difficulty in providing an equitable formula for the transfer of pot allocations to JTQs. 
(ii) A period of uncertainty involved in adapting to a new system. 
(iii) Uncertainty in relation to the cost and ability to provide an adequate law enforcement 
program. 
(iv) Difficulty and increased costs in obtaining adequate data for the ongoing monitoring of 
the levels of recruitment and'breeding stock to enable sustainable TACs to be set. 
If a TAC/ITQ system of management was adopted, a necessary element would be legislation 
by government on the resource sharing arrangements to be adopted between the commercial 
and recreational sectors, both in the short term and the long term. 
The specialised report by MAREC does not discuss a preference for input or output controls. 
However, it does set out that "the objective for the management system if it is to seek to 
optimise the return from lobster markets should be to provide the potential for the catching 
sector to deliver a catch flow which could produce the highest content of products with the 
highest worth". 
The report proposes a management system which includes:- 
* Extending the duration of the season for as long a period as is considered reasonable but 
possibly to the end of September. 
* Providing an efective mechanism to reduce the whites lobster catch by an appropriate weight 
and make lobster stocks available to the winter period until the duration of the extended 
season (subject to the requirements of Section 8)  and in that respec! to give consideration to 
the catching of undersize lobster which otherwise would become white size lobster at the 
following November moult. 
* Providing the mechanism to allowfishermen the potential to take the catch to meet the needs 
of the high worth lobster product markets. 
The MAREC report examined the estimated monthly catch-worth ($/kg catch) for the 
1992/93 catch and also under an arrangement whereby the catch of "whites" is reduced by 
about half and the same quantity caught during the months of July, August and September. It 
concluded that by reducing the "whites" and lengthening the season within the context of the 
1992/93 model there was a potential to increase the net economic benefit to the industry, 
perhaps in the order of $10 million to $20 million. However, the model was used only to 
show the change in value which could have occurred if the catch flow had been able to be 
changed in 1992/93. 
The MAREC report is perhaps best summarised by an introductory note to that report by the 
author:- 
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The Western Australian lobsterfishey is limited to a speczjic catch - the sustainable catch. The pursuit 
of a catch in excess of the sustainable catch in the end is futile. Thus the opportunity for economic 
growth within the indus t y  will be determined not through an increase in catch but through the 
increase in worth realisedfiom the sustainable catch. The role offisheries management is seen therefore 
as one which provides a structure that ensures the conservatiori of thejishey but at the same time acts 
lo rriininrise the inrpedirrrerrts pr(7~~wtirr ty the indiistry (jislrcrrrren, processors and others) from 
optirnising the worth of the catch. 
Irrespective of the method of future management of the rock lobster fishery, a matter of 
importance to both government and industry is the optimal number of boats to be engaged in 
the rock lobster industry. The number has been gradually decreasing since the 1970s from a 
high of 836 to 665 as at 30 June 1993 and to 638 as at 30 June 1994. The setting of a figure for 
the minimum number of boats has implications for the potential of the industry to increase 
the net returns. It would also have implications in relation to a discussion on the minimum 
and maximum holdings of ITEs or ITQs. 
A decision on the minimum fleet size has to be a trade off between economic efficiency and 
social and other benefits which may be perceived to operate. As shown in Professor Lindner's 
specialist paper, the introduction of a minimum fleet size rule would have the effect of 
reducing the net returns compared with that which would apply if market forces determined 
the number of boats. Furthermore, those returns would be distributed amongst a greater 
number of people than would be the case if there was no prescribed minimum fleet size. The 
amount of net return foregone could be of the order of $10 million to $20 million which 
would have to be weighed against the "social and other benefits" to be gained by setting a 
minimum number for the number of boats in the rock lobster fishery. 
The decisions taken resulting from a consideration of this report, and the associated specialist 
reports, on the western rock lobster fishery will be vital to its long term management. It is 
essential that all those engaged in the fishery consider the past growth in the fishing pressure, 
their vision for the industry in, say, ten years from now, and the most appropriate method of 
management in achieving that vision. There are likely to be three principal elements- 
(a) The potential to increase the value of the catch and the het return to the industry. 
(b) The best long term management method, input or output controls, taking into 
account the overriding requirement to ensure an adequate breeding stock but also 
considering that there is now an increasing focus on economic efficiency in fisheries 
management. 
(c) The fleet size and its associated implications for the net reprns as well as for the 
minimum and maximum holdings of ITEs or ITQs. 
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Proposed Procedure and Risks in Setting TACs and TAEs 
The process used to assess a proposed level of nominal or notional TAC is likely to 
follow the same basic approach as has been used with the assessment of other types of 
management strategy. The nominal TAC may represent a value to be used as an 
actual TAC, or may be the equivalent catch expected to be taken with an assigned 
actual TAE. The proposed process is described below, and is shown in the attached 
Figure. 
Information on annual puerulus settlement is used to produce predictions of the 
potential catch that might have been expected in the fishery under the current 
management regime, using the statistical relationships derived from historical 
fisheries data. The potential catch can be a fishery wide or zone statistic that 
represents the level of recruitment that might be expected to occur during the next 
season. 
This prediction of recruitment is then used as input to the various fisheries models, 
which use the proposed level of nominal TAC to estimate the effects on the catch and 
survival to the breeding stock within each fishing region. The resulting estimates of 
breeding stock are then compared with the target breeding stocks that have been 
accepted as the objective for management if future recruitment is to be assured. The 
proposed level of nominal TAC is varied and the process repeated in order to provide 
a range of alternative assessments for consideration by the Advisory Committee. 
..' 
The estimates produced in the assessment are to be compared with the catches, catch 
rates, and breeding stock that result in the fishery as a consequence of the nominal 
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TAC that is finally adopted. This ensures continued improvement of the various 
relationships and models used in the assessment process. 
Where the notional TAC is being applied through an effective TAEATE system, the 
TAE is set directly to target the level of the notional TAC, since the TAE system 
automatically corrects to an extent for inaccuracies in the estimated incoming 
recruitment. That is, when the recruit biomass available is underestimated catch rates 
are correspondingly low and the notional TAC will not be achieved. Conversely, 
when the recruit biomass is overestimated, the catch rate will be unexpectedly high, 
and a catch larger than the notional TAC will be taken, but escapement to the 
breeding stock will be maintained. 
In contrast, where the notional TAC is used as an actual TAC allocated through ITQs, 
effort expands or contracts to achieve the allowed TAC. Where errors in recruit 
biomass estimates occur and the biomass is underestimated, a larger escapement to 
the breeding stock than expected will occur. Conversely, when the biomass is 
overestimated, effort is permitted to expand to take the TAC, and escapement to the 
breeding stock will be reduced or can be minimal. This ''risk'' requires that the 
notional TAC underthis management system needs to be slightly reduced to set a 
conservative "safe" TAC. 
I 
For both the TAE and TAC systems, an adjustment must be made to the notional 
TAC to allow for recreational catch prior to determining the TAC or TAE to be set for 
the commercial fishery. Similarly, any "projected" illegal take of lobsters must be 
deducted fiom the legal TAC if the breeding stock is to be maintained. 
A research paper is currently being prepared by the Research Division, that further 
examines the relative risks associated when the alternative management systems, 
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either using a "total allowable catch'' (TAC, ITQ) or a "total allowable effort" (TAE, 
ITE) system, are used to maintain the rock lobster stock. 
Process for Assessing TACs or TAEs * 
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Research data for stock assessment under TAUITQ management 
Under ITQ management arrangements the relationship between catch and the effort 
applied to the stock by fishermen can be expected over time to change significantly, as 
fishermen modify their fishing strategy to maximise the value rather than quantity of the 
catch. Given that catch per unit of effort (catch per pot lift) is the basic measure of 
abundance of lobsters used by researchers to assess the state of the stock (exploitation 
rates, breeding stock indices etc) the expected changes in effort under ITQ's dictates that 
alternative or additional data will be required to maintain an understanding of the status 
of stock. The need for additional data is strongly supported by overseas research 
experience following the introduction of quota management. Without this additional 
information the success of the management arrangements in maintaining the breeding 
stock cannot be measured or guaranteed. 
The overall impact of the introduction of ITQ's to the rock lobster fishery on the research 
division in the initial stages is likely to require and additional $900,000 per year, if full 
precautions are taken to endure the availability of reliable stock assessment for ongoing 
management. 
The specific changes to research programs and the need for additional information under 
ITQ management have been considered and the changed requirements are set out below: 
1. Total landed catch. 
This data is presently obtained from the processing sector. Unreported purchases or 
catches are small at present as there is no incentive or need to hide catch information 
from researchers or enforcement personnel. Under an ITQ situation, this is expected to 
change (see enforcement implication section) and it must be expected that attempts to 
pass a significant portion of the catch go through a "black market" system will be made. 
This has certainly been the case with other high value, low volume species such as 
lobsters in New Zealand and abalone in Australia. 
For measurement of this "leakage" rate, researchers will have to rely on enforcement 
estimates of the quantities involved and the timing of leakage. While enforcement 
agencies are normally concerned with minimising the "leakage" component, accurate 
measurement of the actual quantities, locations and tiking of catch leakage is not a 
primary objective. In this context, additional enforcement and research resources will be 
required, not to apprehend offenders but to continually monitor the quantity of 
unreported catches seasonally and from year to year. A very approximate estimate of 
such a field survey process is about $50 000 per year. 
2. 
Due to the requirements of ITQ management, the existing monthly returns will probably 
be replaced by &dg quota records of landed catch by all vessels. These compulsory daily 
returns will also replicate and overlap the existing voluntary research log books to come 
extent. In practice, it is not usually feasible to require or ask fishermen to complete 
duplicate research records so it is anticipated that the log book system would be merged 
with the daily quota returns, which would then need to provide space for voluntary 
research data to be recorded (e.g. numbers of undersize, spawners returned, sea state 
etc.). 
Compulsory catch and effort returns/voluntary research log book. 
Such records will provide a more detailed spatial coverage of the fishery than at present. 
However, the reliability of the data will vary. That is, the catch will be under reported to 
61 
Attachment 5 
varying degrees, (black market, high grading etc) and will no longer have the degree of 
confidentiality available to present research log books. Effort data is likely to be recorded 
as normal, however the changing "application" and distribution of effort will result in an 
effort data set not comparable to pre-ITQ times. Radical management changes under and 
ITE system will also cause some distortions in the data but to a lesser extent. 
Voluntary data on spawners, undersize, bait, weather conditions etc are still likely to be 
recorded on the daily quota forms by a proportion of the sluppers. The degree to which 
the voluntary data will be provided, is however, unknown as the existing symbiotic 
relationship between skipper and researcher is replaced by an enforcement interaction. 
Compulsion to force all skippers to provide the presently voluntary data is not an option, 
as this results in a significant decrease in data quality and difficulty in separating "good" 
data from "poor" data. No additional costs will occur except for processing the larger 
volume of data and this will be partially covered by the enforcement systems needed to 
fund a computerised quote record system. 
3. Onboard monitoring 
Under ITQ's, there will need to be a much greater reliance on direct observations by 
research personnel. At present, this program is restricted to onboard monitoring of 
catches at four coastal locations and at the opening of the Abrolhos season. The data 
produced is used to validate and extend the detailed research log book data set. In the 
initial stages, i.e. first five years at least, this program would need to be expanded to 
cover four additional ports including the Abrolhos Is. Based on current costs, 
(approximately $100,000) this would require approximately an additional $150,000 per 
year. Should the season be extended to September, the additional cost would be in the 
order of $200,000. 
4. 
The existing trial program using charter vessels covers six locations and is ultimately 
likely to be scaled back to a smaller number of sites and used to calibrate commercial 
data based indices of spawner abundance. Under ITQ's it is expected that the 
independent breeding stock survey index will need to assume greater significance in the 
ongoing assessment of the status of the fishery/breeding stock levels. 
Fishery independent breeding stock survey. 
Under this scenario, the survey would need to be expanded slightly (one or two 
locations) but increased in effort level from 10 days to 20 days to achieve a greater 
reliability in the index produced. Based on existing budgets, the expanded program 
would require approximately $500,000 per year. 
5. Puerulus monitoring program. 
This program would continue and is likely to expand by one or two sites in "B" zone 
under either ITQ or ITE management. This expansion is expected to be required to 
further refine regional forecasts for industry and management modelling of the fishery. 
The additional costs will be in the order of $5,000 to $10,000 per year. 
6.  Recreational fishery. 
Existing methods of monitoring recreational catches are unlikely to be adequate under an 
ITQ management arrangement. It can be anticipated that a significant shamateur 
operation will develop under ITQ's. Within the existing bag limits, it is likely that some 
legally licensed recreational rock lobster fishermen will become a significant force for 
illicit landing of previous commercial product. A research /enforcement program aimed 
at quantifying any change in this component of the catch will be required as set out in 
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(1). The recreational component of the total catch is also likely to alter significantly if the 
commercial fleet redirects effort away from whites thus leaving a higher abundance at 
the time of peak recreational activity. For each of these reasons it is anticipated that the 
need to both quantify and control recreational catch will require a significantly greater 
research/enforcement program. An ongoing research program to deal with this is 
estimated to cost about $100,000 annually. 
7. Estimating future allowable catches. 
Sustainability of the rock lobster stock requires a control on catch regardless of the 
management system used (either input or output controls). In either case, the 
management process requires the setting of a notional or actual TAC which will allow 
sufficient flow-through of recruits to maintain the breeding stock. Since breeding stock 
levels have been set on a regional basis (to reduce the risk of recruitment failure) the TAC 
will also need to be set regionally. 
The TAC setting process must be based on the relationship between puerulus settlement, 
recruitment to the fishery effort and survivors to breeding sizes. These data are presently 
available with a reasonable level of certainty, i.e. * 20% for the fishery as a whole, based 
on the 25 year puerulus time series from the centre of the fishery. Reliable regional TAC's 
are not yet possible particularly in zone C. A further 10 years of data are required to 
provide a defendable basis for setting TAC's for "C zone" while the "A zone" situation 
probable requires a lesser period (five additional years). 
Any radical alteration to the timing or distribution of catch in the fishery will probably 
affect the development of regional catch prediction systems which are required to 
develop regional TAC's. Since the "successful" introduction of an ITQ system to the rock 
lobster fishery will by definition radically alter the timing of catch and the effort 
seasonally, the timing of any introduction of ITQ's will need to take into consideration 
the need for a data base to set regonal TAC's. Alternative solutions to this difficulty is to 
set a very conservative TAC in "C zone" to take into account the higher degree of risk of 
incorrect prediction of the recruitment in this region. For "A zone", the same strategy 
could be used although a slightly less conservative position could be adopted given the 
more consistent nature of the catches from this sector. 
8. Data Processing and analysis. 
The preceding supplementary data requirements and the changed relationship between 
catch and effort under ITQ's will require additional staff time t'o develop new assessment 
models and statistical analyses. Specifically, research will be required to overcome the 
changes to the indices presently available to monitor the stocks and to try to relate the 
parameter series from before and after the introduction of ITQ's In the short term, this 
would require an additional modeller/statistician over and above existing staff levels for 
a period of approximately five years. Annuals costs including overheads would be in the 
order of $70,000 per year. 
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ROCK LOBSTER QUOTA REGISTRATION AND TRANSFER SYSTEM 
The purpose of h s  paper is to detail mechanisms for the registration and transfer 
of quota in the Western Rock Lobster Fishery if a quota system of management is 
introduced. 
4 
Government and industry requirements of a quota registration system are that it 
be a source of accurate and timely information on quota holdings and 
transactions. To do this a quota regstration system must enable efficient quota 
transfers. The information from the system must be of an evidential standard in 
criminal prosecutions and be able to interface with all aspects of the Department's 
record base. 
The Principles for a quota registration system should include: 
1. a cost efficient and timely administration regime which minimises 
impediments to trading quota; 
limited liability borne by the Crown; 





4. accurate and certain; and r ;. 
5. binding on all parties. 






5 .  
6.  
a register of owners and holders of quota on any particular day; 
a register of the owners of annual harvesting rights; 
a public regster of both the quota right and the annual catching right which 
is available to prospective owners to consider before purchasing such 
rights. 
an ability to conclusively ascertain available catch rights, quota and landed 
catch at any point of time; 
a base for levying statutory charges (linked to Departmental accounting 
systems); 
granting access to the fishery (linked to the licensing system); 
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both parties specifying the quantity of quota involved. The sale is completed 
when the transaction is entered on to the register. Quota transactions would be 
subject to a minimum amount that could be sold. 
Quota holdings would be used to generate an annual catch allocation prior to the 
beginning of each season. The allocations would also be recorded against the 
limited entry licence owned by the quota holder but on a separate register called 
the annual catch allocation register. 
Annual Catch Allocations Register 
At a set time period before the beginning of each season the quota would generate 
an equivalent annual catch allocation (ACA), after the total allowable catch 
(TAC) for the year has been set. 
The ACA would be recorded on a separate register against the licensed boat 
owned by the quota holder. 
After the ACA is generated it would be completely separate fiom the parent quota 
units. The ACA is then the catching right for that year. 
Once registered against a boat, an ACA could be fished or sold in part (subject to 
minimum transfer rules) or in whole to be attached to another licensed boat. As 
the ACA is separated from the quota any sale of ACA has no affect on the 
original quota holding. That is the sale of an ACA is valid only for the year in 
which the sale takes place. For a permanent sale both ACA and quota units 
would be involved If the ACA and the quota which generated the ACA are sold 
two separate transfers would be required. 
Transfers of ACA would only be for unfished entitlements and therefore prior to 
any transfer occurring a reconciliation of catch and remaining ACA would be 
necessary. A transfer of ACA would require both parties to sign the transfer form 
and would not be completed until recorded on the register. 
At the end of the season all records would be removed from the ACA register 
which would remain empty until the next season when a new set of annual catch 
allocations would be generated reflecting the current quota ownership. 
i 
Nexus Between Two Registers 
It is imperative that quota can be cancelled for enforcement purposes. To do this 
a nexus between the two registers must be maintained so that an offence can be 
related to parent quota and the parent quota reduced when required. There are 
two issues: 
1. The parent quota for an annual catch allocation must be identifiable at any 
time in the season. Providing that the limited entry licence is used to 




determining liability for overfishing; and' 
an indcator of the value of the fishery; 
The Government will also use the quota registration system to give effect to 
management decisions, such as pro rata reductions in total allowable catches 
(TACS) and Court ordered forfeitures as required. 
. It is proposed that a regstration system for the rock lobster fishery be divided 'into 
two registers which are independent for transaction purposes but linked by a 
common limited entry fisheries licence. 
1. A quota register whch provides a record of quota ownership and 
transactions. 
2. A register of annual catch allocation (ACA) linked to boats licensed to 
fish in the Western Rock Lobster Fishery (limited entry fishery licence). 
The reason for two registers is to separate the long-term right to fish from the 
annual catch to promote flexibility for licence holders. The New Zealand 
experience suggests that unless these two components are separated the trading of 
catch allocations required within a season is severely constrained by the long- 
term implications of selling quota. If only one register i s  used a separate parallel 
lease system is likely to result. 
Quota Register 
This register would be formed on that day quota is allocated to licence holders 
and be recorded against the limited entry licence. It would provide a record of 
the number of quota units owned by each quota holder. The quota would be the 
long term fishing right. . 
Whilst a limit on the number of pots is retained as a makgement tool in the 
fishery, quota would need to be linked to pots at a set ratio. Therefore the quota 
register would also be a record of the number of pots owned by each of the quota 
holders (either explicitly or by a function of the quota /pot ratio). 
The total of the registered quota units would equal the total quota units for the 
fishery. 
The limited entry licence should be subject to a minimum quota holding which 
would be tied to the amount of annual catch allocation held. If this was the case 
and quota was sold below the minimum holding the licence would not be 
permitted to be used. To enter the fishery a person would have to buy a limited 




Quota could be sold at any time providing that the transfer form is completed by 
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maintained. 
2. The quota holder must be required to retain sufficient quota to enable 
quota penalties to be implemented. A balance needs to be found between 
providing flexibility for quota trading and retaining adequate quota for 
enforcement purposes. It is not envisaged that a situation could occur 
where the total quota would be cancelled as a result of a prosecution. 
Therefore it is suggested that quota holders not be permitted to reduce 
their quota below a third or a half of the maximum annual catch 
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